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CHAPTER I

REVELATION

It

is

precisely

the

focus

upon

the

experience

of the

divine,

transcendent, the holy, the numinous, which distinguishes theology from

the
all

Whether a theologian is concerned with the role

other disciplines of thought.

of the transcendent in aspects of human knowing, the historical critical and
literary

analysis

of

Scripture,

or

the

ramifications

of humanity's

ethical

choices upon the integrity of the environment, there must be some reference
to the divine or else it would not qualify as theo- logy.
"revelation"

bee a use

it

has

traditionally

been

I will use the term
understood

as

the

. communication or mediation of experiences of the divine. The word is derived
' from

the Latin verb revel are,

unveiled, uncovered, or revealed.

the past participle, revelatus
Why is the unveiling

m e an in g

of the divine an

essential element of theology?
First,
depends

the

very

upon one's

comprehension

ability

reveal aspects of the divine.

to

of

another's

theological

recognize those elements

reflection

of thought which

These aspects of revelation are the primary

cornerstones upon which the rest of theological

thought can be built.

The

following statement will serve as an example: God is love; therefore we should
care for our neighbor.

Questions that directly relate to aspects of revelation
1

2

are primary, i.e. Why is God love? What is love? How are the two related?
Questions

that

relate

to

the

corresponding

effects

and

implications

are

secondary, i.e. Why should we care for our neighbor? Who is our neighbor?
In attempting to provide an answer to the question, Why should we care for
our neighbor?, it is first necessary to understand why God is love and what we
mean by love.
first

Likewise, in attempting to understand theological thought, it is

necessary to grasp the underlying fundamental

elements of revelation.

Secondly, the act of constructing theological reflection, also demands that one
be

able

to

recognize

the

elements

of

revelation

in

experience.

The

identification of revelation in experience is essential if one hopes to construct
critical, theological thought.

Thus, this focus on revelation is essential in the

development of one's ability to understand and analyze as well as to construct
theological

thought.

In this thesis, I will provide an analysis of aspects of revelation in the
thought of Paul Tillich and Wolfhart Pannenberg.

There are two primary
First, their

' reasons why I have chosen to focus on these two theologians.

thought is still an active element within contemporary theological discussion.
Thus,

I hope my research will function

discussion.
to

as a helpful contribution to this

Second, both focus on different aspects of revelation which I hope

demonstrate,

if

brought

together,

would

provide

a

more

complete

understanding of the experience of revelation.
I will attempt this analysis with the following two objectives in mind.
First, I hope to provide an explication of the significant aspects of revelation
in

the

thought

necessary

of both

foundation

from

Tillich
which

and

Pannenberg

a more

authentic

which

will

provide

understanding

the

of their

thought can be achieved. Second, by focusing on aspects of revelation in the

3
thought of both Tillich and Pannenberg, I will attempt to construct a fuller,
more adequate understanding of the experience of revelation.
It will be helpful if I first provide a general analysis of revelation.

I

will begin by attempting a brief overview of various ways revelation has been
understood by focusing on Avery Dulles' Models of Revelation.

By

starting

with Dulles' broad survey of revelation, I hope to establish some breadth in the
horizon

of significant elements

and

issues

revelation as a topic in Christian theology.

involved

in

the

thought

Second, I will rely on the thought

of John Baillie in his book The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought
attempt

to

provide

developments

in

the

a brief historical
thought

about

outline

of revelation

of some

that

will

of the

give

and

significant

some historical

perspective to our continuing discussion of revelation as well as to establish
the historical location of Tillich and Pannenberg that will be essential in the
analysis of their thought that will follow.

Third, I will tum to the thought of

H. Richard Niebuhr in his book The Meaning of Revelation

and attempt to

' establish some depth in the horizon by identifying some of the significant
. historical elements involved in revelation.

Fourth, I will focus on the thought

of John Macquarrie in his book Principles of Christian Theology
;._

r,.·

}

and

attempt

to give some depth to existential and ontological elements of revelation.

Fifth,

I will analyze the thought of Gordon D. Kaufman in his book Systematic
Theology:

A Historicist Perspective

highlighting

interrelations involved in thinking about revelation.

some

of

the

important

Finally, I will turn to

the thought of Michael L. Cook, S.J., in his article "Revelation as Metaphoric
Process" and attempt to identify some of the more detailied elements involved
in the interrelations that Kaufman suggests.

By providing both a general

description of the historical situation in which Tillich and Pannenberg are

4

involved, as well as focusing on the significant issues and problems that exist
in examining the general notion of revelation, I hope to provide a more
thorough

analysis

of

their

thought

which

will

contribute

to

a

better

understanding of theological thought today.

Typoloiical

In his book, Models

Suryey

of Revelation, Avery Dulles provides five

distinct models to account for the ways revelation has been understood.

He

uses the criteria of how and where revelation occurs to establish the general
parameters of his models.

Dulles maintains that a typological analysis of

revelation

in

may

be

helpful

attempting

to

understand

revelation

in

the

complex plurality of our times, but cautions against the uncritical placement
of a theologian's thought within a particular model.

He suggests that a variety

of models, as in physics, may be necessary in order to account for the complex
'and diverse experience of revelation adequately.
In Dulles' first model, revelation is characterized as doctrine.
is traditionally understood as a formal teaching or statement of belief.

Doctrine
Dulles

also refers to this model as the "propositional" model which indicates the act of
expressing doctrine, or what is to be believed.

This model suggests that

revelation does occur in nature, but as a result of the transcendence of God and
the reality of human sin, a special source of revelation is necessary.

Thus, a

supernatural

of this

model.

conception

of

revelation

is

a

characteristic

element

For Christians accepting this model, Jesus Christ as well as the Bible are

thought to be sources of this supernatural revelation.

"What God has revealed,

they insist, is truth and is capable of being communicated to human minds

5
through

articulate

formulated

speech." 1

dogma and

revealed truth.

This

model

aspects of tradition

maintains

that

are understood

authoritatively
to

be divinely

The proper response to this understanding of revelation is

faithful assent to truth understood to be revealed in authoritative sources.

It is

understood that the Holy Spirit, working in the heart of believers, is an
important element in this process.2
grasp divine truth.
of the

The Holy Spirit allows the believer to

The primary advantage of this model is in its recognition

importance of tradition as an

interpretive medium.

A significant

disadvantage is its failure to understand and speak meaningfully to much of
human

experience.
In his second model, revelation is understood as history.

There are

varying degrees to which the proponents of this model identify revelation
with

history.

Dulles

remarks

that

Pannenberg

identification of history and revelation.

argues

for

the

closest

Pannenberg rejects the nineteenth-

century salvation school, also represented by this model, as being inconsistent
. : and stopping halfway.
1 •

For him revelation is not to be found in a special

segment of history but rather is

universal history. In his view, revelation is

understood to be deeds and events rather than words.

Information within

·doctrine and the Bible is understood as signposts and documentation rather
than

revelation. 3

Pannenberg understands

the events of history.

God to be revealed in and through

By stressing that it is the events themselves which

carry what is necessary for revelation to take place, Pannenberg attempts to
overcome the dichotomy between event and interpretation.

"When the events

1Avery Dulles, S.J., Models of Revelation (New York: Doubleday, 1983), p. 39.
2/bid., p. 46.
3/bid., p. 54.

6

are taken seriously for what they are, and in the historical context to which
they belong, then they speak their own language, the language of facts."4
we

shall

see,

the historical events, for Pannenberg,

As

are "self-interpreting."

What is needed to grasp revelation is the use of ones natural reason directed at
the universal events of history.

By "universal" Pannenberg means the entire
Faith is not

history of the world as it moves ahead toward its final aim.

required for understanding revelation, but rather it is revelation encountered
within

universal

Pannenberg's

history

thought

which

represent

brings

about

significant

faith.

aspects

of

These
the

elements
second

of

model

which are important in Dulles' analysis of revelation understood as history.
Later we shall analyize these elements of Pannenberg's thought as well as a
variety

of

others · that

revelation as history.

are

essential

in

understanding

his

conception

of

For now it is important to keep in mind the typological

placement of Pannenberg's thought in Dulles' schema so that we may more
objectively question the veracity and integrity of his view by grasping its
distinctions as well as similarities with the various elements of Dulles' five
A significant value of this model is its ability to capture

models of revelation.

the richness of revelation by referring to historical events rather than mere
words.

However,

"it

commonly

neglects

the

factors

which

control

the

selection and interpretation of past events on the part of the biblical writers
or the Church ... 5
Dulles' third model understands revelation

as

inner experience.

By

stressing an internal, personal understanding of revelation, this model is free
from

theories that describe mediation.

4Jbid., p. 59.
5/bid., p. 123.

"The content of revelation in this

7
model,

is

neither

information

about

the

past nor

abstract doctrinal

truth.

Rather, the content is God as he lovingly communicates himself to the soul that
is open to him. "6

A primary characteristic of this model is that revelation

exists as an experience and not only as an idea.

A value of this model is its

insistence that what matters is not deeds or words, but God himself.

However,

this model has a difficult time attempting to communicate this transcendent
experience of God.
The fourth model understands revelation as a dialectical presence.

This

model stresses that as a result of divine transcendence and human sinfulness,
God's presence and activity can never be immediately discovered in doctrinal
statements, historical fact, or religious experience.

Yet, at the same time, it is

convinced that God, through faith, can choose to present himself to us in
language, history, and experience.
of a simultaneous yes and no.

This model is characterized by the mystery
The stress is on the will and choice of God.

Whereas in the model of history, faith is a result of revelation, this model
: maintains that faith
, take place.

The primary value of this model lies in its reminder of the distance

·between us and God.
; .humility
' .~

is the essential requirement in order for revelation to

Also, it illustrates our sinfulness and constant need for

and forgiveness.

A problem with this model, resulting from

its

,.

contradictory

statements,

is

its

inability

to

provide

a coherent,

intelligible

message.7
The fifth and final model understands revelation as new awareness.

In

this model, revelation is not understood as outside or separate but occurs
rather

"when human powers

6/bid., p. 77.
1/bid., p. 123.

are

raised to

their highest

pitch of activity.

8
Rather than going beyond experience,
participation in divine life. "8

revelation is itself an experience of

This model views God as the horizon of religious

experience rather than as the object.

"The form of revelation in this model is

that of a breakthrough into a more advanced stage of human consciousness,
such that the self is experienced as constituted and empowered by the divine
presence ... 9

In referring to Tillich, Dulles says, "Revelation, for him, did not

derive from experience as a source, but it could not occur unless mediated by
experience." 1 O

According to the doctrinal model, the word and dogma are

sources of revelation.

The historical model emphasizes that it is history itself

which is the source of revelation.

This model differs from both of these in that

it stresses the source of revelation is God while maintaining that the medium
of its mediation is human experience.

Tillich certainly maintains this position

but does so through the use of ontological categories.

For Tillich, what is

mediated through all aspects of reality (i.e. doctrine, history, language, people,
events, etc.) is being-itself.

Being grasped by being-itself mediating through

: some aspect of reality, humanity is faced with an ultimate concern.
' , , representing

the

primary

characteristics

of the

fifth

model

By

of revelation,

, ·Tillich functions as an important element in Dulles' schema. In the following
•

chapter we shall see, in detail, Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate
1

,

~ ...

concern.

For now, it is important to keep in mind that Dulles uses Tillich's

thought to illustrate the general parameters of his fifth model of revelation as
new awareness.

We should keep the aspects of Dulles' other models in mind in

analyizing Tillich so that we may consider aspects of his thought which he

8/bid., p. 98.
9/bid., p. 109.
IO/bid., p. 102.

9
may not necessarily consider.

In this way it will be possible to provide a more

objective and authentic analysis of his understanding of revelation as ultimate
concern.

A value of this model is its emphasis on the value of revelation for

the human person.

It has a difficult time, however, reflecting on revelation

for other times and places and is often charged with relativity. I 1
These five models characterize ways revelation has been thought about
and

understood.

With

regard

to

Tillich

this

analysis

is

important

in

identifying his understanding of revelation as a mediation of the divine by
means of experience through aspects of reality represented by Dulles' fifth
model of revelation.

Within the development of Tillich's analysis of revelation

as new awareness we will need to explain in greater detail how Tillich views
doctrine
Tillich

as

a medium of revelation rather than as revelation itself (what

will

call the demonic).

understands the

We will need to focus

interrelation between history

and

on how Tillich

revelation

(we

shall

see

that an identification of history with revelation is not possible for Tillich
' because of the distinction between the transcending character of being which
' · , cannot directly participate in the subject-object structure of finitude).

We will

· need to focus on the possibiltiy of Tillich's understanding of revelation as an
; , immediate experience (revelation, for Tillich is humanity's ultimate concern
'

· ·: which is mediated by experience rather than identical with it).

And finally,

we will need to explain how Tillich's conception of revelation relates to a
dialectical understanding (we will see that there is a close identification of this
view with Tillich's in the sense that he stresses that we are grasped by
revelation rather than grasping it).
With regard to Pannenberg, this analysis of Dulles' models of revelation
11 Ibid., P. 123.

10
is important by identifying his understanding of revelation as an element of
universal history represented by the second model.

Within the analysis of

Pannenberg's understanding of revelation, we will need to focus on the way
he views the function of doctrine (we will see that doctrine functions as a
record of revelation rather than revelation itself).

We will need to focus on

the

of

role

of

experience

in

Pannenberg's

view

universal

history

(for

Pannenberg, revelation is an external experience of universal history rather
than an internal personal feeling).

We will need to examine how his view of

revelation accounts for the dialectical presense of God (for Pannenberg, God is
experienced within the whole of history by means of natural reason).

Finally,

we will need to see how Pannenberg's view of revelation takes into account
the understanding of revelation as a new awareness (we will see that for
Panneneberg God is not revealed through experience, but is the experience of
universal history).
Dulles,

By focusing on these aspects of revelation developed by

we will be able to bring a more expansive variety of questions to our

·discussion of ultimate concern and universal history as aspects of revelation
· , in the thought of Tillich and Pannenberg which should allow for a more
: adequate analysis of their positions.

Before providing some depth and detail to

·'

some of these aspects, I will attempt to establish some historical perspective.

Historical

Suryey

John Baillie notes, in his book The

Thought,

Idea

of Revelation

that for the greater part of Christian history

in

Recent

revelation was

understood as either the knowledge of God discerned by reflection upon nature
by actions of the human intellect, or the direct self-disclosure of God.

He says,

11

"This way of defining revelation as communicating a body of knowledge, some
part at least of which could be independently obtained, or at least verified, by
'the light of reason and nature,' while the remainder was supplemental to
what could be so obtained or verified, was long to remain unchallenged." 1 2
Baillie suggests that after the end of the middle ages, there were two
significant shifts in the emphasis of these categories of revelation.

The

rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries relied more and more
on reason as a source of truth and less and less on divine self-disclosure.

Those

holding extreme positions maintained that it was by reason alone that we could
grasp

revelation.

We

see

here

the

characterizing revelation as doctrine.

foundation

of

Dulles'

first

model

By maintaining that revelation could

unerringly be grasped by reason, it was possible to establish an authoritarian
"doctrine" of revelation.
position.

Spinoza demonstrated somewhat more of a middle

Although he accepts reason

as the primary

authority of truth,

Spinoza acknowledges that revelation is involved with obedience and piety.
'Baillie notes that a significant function

of revelation for Spinoza is its

, . , assurance that the common man as well as the philosopher could achieve
, blessedness. I 3
The other significant shift in emphasis was brought about by the early
leaders of the Protestant reformation.

They maintained that human reason

was so corrupt that it was not able to grasp revelation.

Consequently, there

was a corresponding shift from

understanding revelation to be present in

reason

an

and

natural theology to

almost exclusive

12John Baillie, The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought
5 ff.
13/bid., p. 7.

reliance on scripture

(New York: Columbia, 1956), pp.

12
alone.

We see here the underlying factors contributing to the development of

Dulles' fourth model of revelation understood as dialectical presence.

For the

proponents of this model, human reason is too corrupt to grasp adequately the
revelation of God.

This model maintains that, on the one hand, God cannot be

known, but on the other, in faith, God can choose to be revealed.

This explains

the characteristic "yes and no" element of this postion.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century rationalist theology was faced
with

the

thinkers

challenge
like

of the

Immanuel

developing

Kant

Romantic

set out to contain

movement.

Rationalist

revelation within

reason

altogether.

This, according to Kant, was necessary in order to distinguish it

from

which should not

faith

alt.14

Thus

revelation was abolished from natural as well as rational theology.

This

understanding
awareness.

comes

close

to

be

associated with

Dulles'

fifth

model

reason

at

of revelation

as

new

Proponents of this theory do not wish to identify revelation with

experience at all but rather as a participation in the divine which is mediated
: through
·'

experience.

Well immersed in the stream of German romanticism with pietistic

: . undercurrents, Schleiermacher struggled to take a path that steered between
· the traditional dichotomy of reason and revelation.

' /.

For Schleiermacher, the

, . ~ ...

source of religion was not the authoritative truths nor the result of cognitive
activity, rather the source of religion was the feeling of dependence on God.
Here we see traces of Dulles' third model of revelation understood as an
individual, personal experience.

Attempting to avoid the problems associated

with understanding revelation identified either with reason or within nature,
Schleiermacher choose to identify it with the internal experience of feeling.
14/bid., p. 10.

13
Likewise, Ritschl followed a path that did not identify revelation with either of
the elements of the traditional dichotomy.
with the value judgements of faith.15

For Ritschl, revelation is identified

Thus, toward the end of the nineteenth

century there was great diversity in the meaning and function of revelation.
This diversity accounts for the wide variety of conceptions of revelation
outlined within Dulles' five models of revelation.

Prominent Twentieth Centuzy

Approaches

More recently, there has been much emphasis on the element of history
within theological discussion.

Because of this, H. Richard Niebuhr believes

there has been a re-evaluation of the meaning of revelation in the twentieth
century.

It is within his analysis of revelation that we find the historical

placement of revelation as history.

Thus, Niebuhr continues the historical

discussion of revelation that was begun by Baillie and allows us to place Dulles'
:remaining model in its historical perspective.

:' H. Richard Niebuhr

In his book, The Meaning of Revelation, H. Richard Niebuhr notes the
conflicts

that

were

involved

throughout the

Christian

Church

apart

from

. Baillie's emphasis in the development of revelation particularly in continental
Protestantism.

Niebuhr notes that what was at stake in the debates about

miracles, prophecy, and between reason and revelation by the deists

and

supematuralists in the eighteenth century, was the traditional right of the
15/bid., p. 14.

14

Church to exercise its authority over society.16

Reason, on the other hand,

was taken up by the rebellious, democratic, mercantile civilization.

As a result

of the conflict, both the understanding of reason as well as revelation were
badly damaged.

The supernaturalists, stressing the divine authority of the

Church, viewed the rationalists with scepticism as unfaithful to the tradition.
The rationalists viewed the supernaturalists as naive and close minded for not
taking into account much of the developments of the enlightenment.

The

period was characterized with much scepticism and misunderstanding.
The obvious question that Niebuhr asks

is

why has the twentieth

century seen such an interest in revelation when the very thought of the
term brings to mind these unfonunate conflicts of the past?

The answer, for

Niebuhr, has to do with the development of the idea of spatial and temporal
relativity
thought.17

which

he

believes

has

profoundly

affected

twentieth

century

Developing from this idea, a wider manifestation of its principles

has also significantly affected historical and social relativity.

Today, western

: culture generally recognizes that reason is limited by the field of experience
/,and also by its historical and social character.
: historical and social relativity.

. to
'i ~

,

,:..

For us, there is no escaping

Niebuhr suggests that the modem tum back

the emphasis on revelation is not to re-hash the traditional conflicts, but

rather

to

re-evaluate

and

reflect

on

religion

in

light

of

contemporary

experience; panicularly, the discovery that one's point of view has a profound
. influence on the understanding of religious as well as any other aspect of
reality .18

This development was the spark which ignited the emphasis on the

16tt.Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (Macmillan, 1960), p. 1.
11 /bid., p. 5.
18 fbid.
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close interrelation between revelation and history.

Out of it. the various

elements of Dulles' second model, including Pannenberg's understanding of
universal history, developed.
For Niebuhr, God is the being upon whom we are dependent for our
worth and existence. His claim, however, differs from that of Schleiennacher's
in that his emphasis is on God rather than the experience of the subject.
fact,

Niebuhr criticizes

both

Schleiermacher and

emphasis on the subject rather than God.

Ritschl

for putting

In
the

Their positions, he maintains, are

certainly an improvement over the rationalists focus on the object; however,
they still fail to recognize the true source of revelation.
Emphasizing that it is God and not the object or subject whom we are
dependent

upon,

the

question

understand this God?"

found

in

may

"How can

we come

to

know

and

Niebuhr insists that any experience of the numinous

must be interpreted experience.
be

arises,

different

:different points of view."19

"Religious experience and moral sense are to
settings

and

can

be

interpreted

from

many

However, in stressing that revelation is history,

(which has already been recognized as relative, there is an apparent paradox:
: Revelation cannot mean history, which is relative, and God!!

The gap between

. the two is conveyed by Lessing's well known "ugly, broad ditch."

If revelation

'.:'is history then people today commit the same error as the Rationalists and
Romantics by putting their trust and faith in the here and now and not in God.
At the same time however, Niebuhr maintains that faith is not possible apart
from history which is the medium in which we live.

Niebuhr attempts to solve

the classical faith/history problem by providing a more detailed examination
of the nature of history.
19/bid., p. 39.
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For Niebuhr, there is an important distinction between the impersonal
objects

of ideas,

personal

subjects

interests,
of

and

selves

movements
in

in

community

"external history"

and the

within

history."

"internal

According to him, revelation can never be located in external history but
must, as it has in the past, be located in the internal history of one's
community.20

He suggests that this position is supported by traditional

emphasis in the past on revelation in subjective events-- events in the lives of
the subjects within a community.

The events of this internal history cannot

be objectively observed, rather "the history of the inner life can only be
confessed by selves who speak of what happened to them in the community of
other

selves ... 21

Within this understanding of the internal history of a

community lies the key that Niebuhr uses to unlock the door that separates
history and faith.

He says:

An inner history, life's flow as regarded from the point of view of living selves, is
always an affair of faith. As long as a man lives he must believe in something for
the sake of which he lives; without belief in something that makes life worth living
man cannot exist. . . Such faith in gods or in values for which men live is
inseparable from internal history. 2 2

Thus, Niebuhr understands faith as the recognition of meaning and unity in
; }he personal lives of members within a community. Faith is

intrinsically

'

,, : involved in the workings of inner history.
By discussing internal and external history separately, Niebuhr does
not wish to suggest

an

extreme dualism exists between them;

rather, he

emphasizes that the external happenings of history are directly contributory

20/bid., p. 53.
211 bid., p. 54.
22/bid., pp. 56-57.
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to the events of internal history.
form

the

foundation

and

communicate, and function.
earthen

nature

It is the elements of external history which

structure

of

the

world

in

which

we

live,

External history has "reminded the church of the

of the vessel

in

which the treasure of faith

existed. "2 3

According to Niebuhr, God is not only the being which is revealed through the
internal history of a community, but also the creator of all things.

As a result

of this, it is also necessary to attempt to look beyond the limited confines of
one's

particular internal

things and · all events.

history

into the more

universal

existence of all

Internal and external history are integrally related in

that the very existence of internal history is dependent upon
which provides its embodiment.

external history

" 'Words without thought never to heaven go'

but thoughts without words never remain on earth."24
For Niebuhr, there is also an integral relationship between revelation
and reason.

It is reason, with the continuing conversation between sensation

and imagination, that allows us to understand and communicate revelation
'within the internal

structure of our history .

On the other hand, it is

.·1evelation itself, discovered within internal history, that guides the process of
reason.

.·reason
/.

"Without revelation reason is limited and guided into error; without
revelation illuminates only itself. n25

This circular understanding of

';:'revelation is summarized by Niebuhr:
Revelation means the moment in our history through which we know ourselves to be
known from beginning to end, in which we are apprehended by the knower; it
means the self-disclosing of that eternal knower. Revelation means the moment in
which we are surprised by the knowledge of someone there in the darkness and the
void of human life; it means the self-disclosure of light in our darkness.

23fbid., p. 63.
24fbid., pp. 65-66.
25fbid., p. 89.
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Revelation is the moment in which we find our judging selves to be judged not by
ourselves or our neighbors but by one who knows the final secrets of the heart;
revelation means the self-disclosure of the judge. Revelation means that we find
ourselves to be valued rather than valuing and that all our values are transvaluated
by the activity of a universal valuer. 2 6

This

understanding

of

revelation

itself taking

the

active

role

and

the

individual taking the passive role is taken up by John Macquarrie's focus on
the

Heideggerian

Macquarrie,

modes

who

gives

of

conceptual

existential

and

knowledge.
ontological

Before
depth

turning

to

to

Niebuhr's

conception of history, it will be helpful if we take a moment to highlight the
significant issues that Niebuhr raises in his analysis of revelation.
Clearly the central issue of revelation for Niebuhr is history.
great deal of time

to point out

relationship to revelation.

the complex

He takes a

nature of history

and

its

For him, history is made up of both objective, non-

personal, external elements which embody the subjective, personal, internal
aspects.

It is within the internal history of a community that one recognizes

and is recognized by faith as having meaning and unity.

Finally, Niebuhr

.stresses the importance of reason which is necessary for understanding and
,1

.communicating revelation, but also being dependent, along with action, upon

, .. revelation

for guidance

and

direction.

Niebuhr,

as

well

as Pannenberg,

; paving been influenced by the historical/critical movement of this century,
'

': : have similar views of history.
a

unity.

Niebuhr stresses

Both Niebuhr and Pannenberg view history as
the

integration

of the

internal

and

external

elements of history for the recognition of its unity; Pannenberg stresses the
universal observation of history as a whole for the recognition of its unity.
For Tillich, history is comprized of an immanent and a transcendent element.

26ibid., pp. 111-112
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The immanent is life within the temporal limits of time and space.

The

transcendent is being-itself which can be mediated through all of reality.

As

we shall see, Tillich stresses that both elements are necessary in order to
interpret and understand historical events.

John

Macquarrie

Whereas
Macquarrie
historical
community
maintains

is

Niebuhr
concerned

process.
is
that

focuses

the
this

with

on
the

historical

ontological

He

recognizes

source

of any

understanding

the

that

the

aspects

foundation
historical

of

underlying

experience

recognition of revelation,
of revelation

is

revelation,

mediated

the

of

a

however,

he

through

the

relatively objective aspects of scripture and tradition which the community
has

founded.27

Macquarrie stresses that in order for this to occur, it is first

necessary for one to be existentially aware of the mood of anxiety.

This mood,

'which can be understood as a certain "mode of awareness" is the result of
r

,realization of the polarities and tensions in human life.

Thus, faced with

;' possibility and responsibility, on the one hand, and finitude and death on the
· . Other, anxiety and concern about existence develop.

Macquarrie says:

This mood may be said to constitute our capacity for rece1vmg revelation.
It
predisposes us to recognize the approach of holy being. In other words, I am
asserting a continuity between the quest for sense and grace that arises out of
man's existence, and the directionally opposite quest for man to which
experiences of grace and revelation bear witness, a quest that is initiated outside
of man and remains beyond his control.2 8

27John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology
1977), p. 9.
2 8/bid., p. 87.

(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
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As a result of this mood of anxiety we experience being.
Most of the time we are only aware of particular things: color. sound.
shape. etc.

However, as a result of the mood of anxiety. we become aware of

being. which is no particular thing but the condition for any-thing
all.

"Being is all the time around us, but for the most part it does not get

explicitly
not

to be at

noticed. 29
11

participate

reality.

in

the

It is not possible to conceptualize being because it does

subject/object

interchange

of our temporal

spatial

Rather being is experienced more as a presence and manifestation.

Thus one who experiences revelation is aware of the same things
does not, but in a different way.30

as one who

The difference lies in the recognition of

the universal being in and through all particular things.

Macquarrie states

that this understanding of being as revelation is similar to Rudolf Otto's
conception of mysterium tremendum fascinans
overwhelming

and

The mysterium

'tremendum
, ·fascinans

(the mystery that is at once

fascinating) in his well know book The Idea of the Holy.

refers

to

the

incomprehensible

depth

of the

holy,

the

emphasizes the otherness and transcendence of the holy, and the
represents the unveiling of the grace of the holy as the source and

: strength of our being. 3 I
In attempting to locate this experience of revelation in our cognitive
activity,

Macquarrie relies heavily on

levels or modes of thinking.
experience.

Martin Heidegger's understanding of

There are generally three modes of cognitive

The first mode is concerned with the objective observation of

external things.

29/bid.
30/bid .• p. 89.
3 l Jbid .. pp. 87-88.

Heidegger refers to this mode as calculative thinking.

The
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ideal goal is to become a pure spectator of objective happenings.

In a sense,

we subject the external objects of our world to our rational objectification by
attempting to master their essence and reality.

The human is the active

subject, the thing is the passive object.
The second level of thinking is the existential mode.

In this mode, one

does not take what is thought about as an object, but rather recognizes what is
thought about as another subject having the same kind of being as the one
doing the thinking.32
physiological

changes

Whereas in the previous mode fear is understood as the
in heart

rate,

respiration,

etc.;

here

fear

would

be

understood as the "existent's own first-hand participation in the experience of
fear, and, prior to that, on his participation in a finite existence for which
fear is a possibility."33
active subjects.

The human is the active subject engaged with other

There is activity on both sides grounded in mutuality and

reciprocity.
The
mode.
1.

third

and

final

category of thinking

is the

primordial/essential

The primary characteristic of this mode is much more meditative than

,calculative.

It is thinking

which

answers to the demand

of being.

In

describing this mode of thought, Macquarrie says:

·'

What would seem to happen both in the primordial thinking of the philosopher and
in the revelatory experience of the religious man (if indeed these two can be
definitely distinguished) is that the initiative passes to that which is known, so
that we are seized by it and it impresses itself upon us. But what is known is not
another being, but rather being itself, the being which communicates itself
through all the particular beings by which it is present, by which it manifests
itself, and not least through the depth of our own being, for we too are participants
in being and indeed the only participants to which being opens itself, so that we
not only are but we exist.3 4

32/bid., p. 92.
33/bid.
3 4 /bid., p. 94.
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Macquarrie identifies his ontological understanding of revelation within this
mode of cognitive experience.
like knowledge.

For him, the reality of being resembles gift-

Whereas in the first mode of cognitive experience we are

active subjects directing our observations upon passive objects, and the second
mode in which we are mutually active subjects, within this third mode the
category of being, for the most part, is the active subject which directs the
awareness of its manifestation upon us, who, have become the objects of its
revelation.

Although

there

is

certainly

an

element

of passivity

in our

disposition with regard to this final mode of thinking, Macquarrie points out
that we are not fully passive.

He suggests that there is an element of

appropriation in which being "reveals itself not only in otherness but also in
kinship, so that even as we are grasped by it, we can to some extent grasp it in
turn and hold to it. n3 5
In

summary,

Macquarrie

acknowledges

the

notion

of the

historical

mediation of revelation but directs his focus on the existential, ontological
:'interrelation
this

between

understanding

concern.

cognitive
of

Macquarrie's

experience

revelation

and

demands

understanding

of

:,1'esembles Tillich's notion of ultimate concern.

revelation.

involvement,
revelation

as

For Macquarrie,
participation
concern

and

strongly

Both have been influenced by

" , Heidegger's ontological theory and share the understanding of revelation as
being-itself which can become our ultimate concern.

On the other hand,

Pannenberg is much less concerned with ontology and much more concerned
with history.

As we shall see in our analysis of Pannenberg, revelation is not

· a sense of concern stemming from the presence of being in reality, but rather

35/bid., p. 95.
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a universal conception of history as a unified whole.
reality is revelation.

For Pannenberg, all of

But in order to accurately recognize it, one must be able

to place it within the universal schema of history as a whole.
By providing some depth to the ontological elements of revelation
which were preliminarily exposed within Dulles' fifth model of revelation as
new awareness, we will be able to approach the thought of Tillich and
Pannenberg more objectively.

In the following analysis of Tillich, we will

need to focus on how the ontological categories outlined here by Macquarrie
relate to the historical elements stressed by Niebuhr.

In our analysis of

Pannenberg we will need to see how he is able to focus on history with little
regard to ontology.

Gordon D. Kaufman

Whereas Niebuhr provided the emphasis and detail on the historical
·aspects of revelation and Macquarrie focused upon some of the existential and
/,ontological elements, Gordon D. Kaufman, in his book Systematic Theology: A

, , Historicist

Perspective, sets out to emphasize that the correlation of both

. historical mediation as well as ontological depth is necessary in order to
·/understand revelation adequately.

He does not provide the historical depth of

Niebuhr nor the existential depth of Macquarrie, but rather provides breadth
that manages to tie together a variety of some of the significant elements and
interrelations involved in understanding revelation.

Like Niebuhr, Kaufman

recognizes that all knowledge is relative to the historical situation of the
knower.36

He also maintains that "the ontological foundations of our deepest

36oordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective

(New York: Charles
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convictions are in history ... 3 7

He believes these ontological foundations are

the

that

sources

of meaningfulness

events or processes.

Kaufman

meaning present within history.

are

grounded

stresses

in

that there

individual

historical

various

shades of

are

This meaning relates to either a moment of

conversion or formation of self-structure or the events within a tradition that
have

central

revelatory

significance for a tradition.

experience:

the

Thus

personal-individual

there

and

are

the

two

levels of

cultural-historical.

These are existentially correlated in such a way that a given tradition has
ultimate meaning for a person or gives meaning to history.
Kaufman distinguishes between scientific and historical knowledge by
focusing

on

their

epistemological

foundations.

Whereas

science

attempts

abstract "inferences"

and "imaginative leaps" to form meaningful unities of

"great

observations

varieties

of

drawn

from

widely

separated

tracts

of

experience," events in history "can be known in their particularity and detail
only through evidences given by eyewitnesses and inferences based on these
·evidences. "38
1

Thus it is the conviction of Kaufman that God is present and

',working in the words and deeds of people in history.

He maintains that there

are three roots of our knowledge of the Christian faith in historical events.
· · . The Bible holds the collection of primary witnesses of the original events.

The

'::'history and tradition of the church form the collection of secondary sources
and

interpretations

of

the

events

within

the

Bible.

And

finally,

the

apprehension and conviction of truth within doctrine forms the third source
of knowledge.

Along with these historical events, Kaufman suggests that a

Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 14.
31 Jbid., p. 25.
38/bid., pp. 42-43.
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second

norm

experience.

guiding

our

theological

work

must

be

our

contemporary

He says, "It is with reference to the historical norm that we can

adjudge whether a given position or claim is 'Christian;' it is with reference to
the

experiential

norm

that

we

adjudge

whether it

'makes

In a

sense.'3 9

footnote Kaufman explains that the interrelation between these two elements
is much more complicated than he suggests.

In it, he gives some dimension to

several of the more complex historical and existential elements that are at
work (i.e. the dependence of the historical dimension on criteria of method,
conception of truth, etc.
considerable

influence

He also notes that historically created categories have
on

one's

existential

view). 40

Kaufman is not as

concerned with the complex details of the interrelation, rather, he stresses
that one should recognize that these two elements exist and are distinct and
important aspects involved in understanding revelation.
Thus, Kaufman's stress on the correlation between the existential as
well

as

historical

elements

in

understanding

revelation

shows

the

. interrelation of Dulles' second model of revelation as history and fifth model of
, ,revelation as new awareness.
, · Tillich

and

Pannenberg

· revelation.

meaning

relating

to

this

corelative

understanding

of

As far as emphasizing the significance of history as well as

·:: ' experience
Whereas

This analysis will allow us to ask questions of

in

attempting

Kaufman
and

to

maintains

revelation;

grasp
that

revelation,
historical

Kaufman
events

resembles

Tillich.

directly

convey

can

Tillich stresses that history only functions

as an

indirect medium through which revelation is understood as ultimate concern.
Pannenberg

39/bid., p. 76.
40 Ibid., p. 78.

is

not

as

interested

in

a correlation

between

experience and
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history.

He is convinced that history is one with experience.

essential element necessary to experience revelation.

It alone is the

Kaufman's stress on the

necessity of encorporating both elements in one's understanding of revelation
is something we shall keep in mind in analyizing the thought of both Tillich
and Pannenberg.

With regard to Tillich, we will need to focus on how this

interrelation takes place.

With Pannenberg, we will need to understand why

there is no necessity for the ontological, existential element.

Michael L. Cook

Adding some depth and detail to this complex relationship between the
texts of history and contemporary experience is Michael L. Cook, S.J.
stressing the necessity of using

a metaphoric

By

process in order to grasp

revelation, Cook provides some detail to the use of symbol outlined by Dulles'
fifth model of revelation as new awareness .

Whereas the previous analysis

. :provided detail to the function of history and ontology in revelation, Cook
1

,demonstrates

some

of the

cognitive,

hermeneutical

, . attempting to interpret and understand revelation.

.·' as
,:.

Metaphoric

elements

involved

in

In his article "Revelation

Process, 41 Cook turns to revelation, which he views as the
11

·;: foundation of all Christian theologizing, in an attempt to answer the "crucial
but unanswered question of contemporary theology:" What is the relationship
between the universal salvific will of God and the absolute uniqueness of
Jesus?

Cook

attempts

to

answer the question

by

relying on

what he

understands to be a more unitive and universal ground for resolving such

4 1Michael L. Cook, S.J., "Revelation as Metaphoric Process" Theological Studies

1986).

41 (Sept.
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questions in the primary language of symbol. metaphor. and story.42

In his

article he lays out a metaphoric process by which he attempts to intertwine
the specifically Christian with the more universally human.
his metaphoric process with Dulles' Models of Revelation,
all models are
organizational

metaphoric in the sense that they
potential.

Cook

stresses

that

root

In comparing

Cook explains that

possess comprehensive.
metaphors

(i.e.

those

metaphors which express the most basic assumptions about reality). which he
uses.

are more fundamental

models of revelation.43

and pervasive and thus subordinate all

other

Cook provides excellent insight into the essence of

revelation and the necessity of using metaphoric language in attempting to
understand the complex interrelationships involved.

He says:

The question of revelation is finally a question of truth. In terms of the models, it
is a question of the interrelationship of propositional truth. historical truth,
personal truth (in the sense of direct experience, whether immediate or mediated),
transcendent truth, and immanent truth. Such an interrelationship depends upon
how one understands symbol as related to the language of metaphor and story
(particularly myth and parable), on the one hand, and more conceptual forms such
as simile, allegory, and analogy, on the other. I suggest that an analysis of these
relationships will affirm the primacy of story in the revelatory process, a primacy
that reflects the narrative quality of all human experience.4 4
,r:

, . According to Cook, symbol has the power to invoke mystery because it is able
· to address itself to the whole person: the imagination, will, emotions, and

• ,t.

,· :' intellect.

It is deeply rooted in human experience and history and emerges

from the depth of human consciousness both individual and collective.

"This

symbolic rootedness in life (bios ) must come to expression, the level of
articulation
.42/bid ..
43/bid.,
44Jbid.,
45/bid ..

(logos ), as metaphor ... 45

pp. 388-389.

p. 389.
pp. 390-391.
p. 392.

Symbol and metaphor are integrally
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related: symbols need metaphors for expression and meaning, metaphors need
symbols

in order to be

Interpretation Theory
metaphor.

rooted

in life.

in explaining the

Cook

refers to

Paul Ricoeur's

relationship between

symbol

and

Ricoeur says:

Everything indicates that symbolic experience calls for a work of meaning from
metaphor, a work which it partially provides through its organizational network
and its hierarchical levels. Everything indicates that symbol systems constitute a
reservoir of meaning whose metaphoric potential is yet to be spoken.4 6

The value of metaphor is in its ability to place two active thoughts in tension
with one another which leads to mutual interaction between them.
stresses that a metaphor is represented by A=B.47

Cook

A Yiddish saying will serve

as an example: "To a worm in horseradish the whole world is horseradish."
This tensive interaction between the elements of a metaphor can result in new
Metaphor cannot be literalized or it will die.

possibilities.

Also, it requires

panicipation in its referent (i.e. using the above example, one must, to some
,degree, know what a worm and horseradish are in order to become aware of
; 'the metaphoric possibilities).

"In the final analysis, one cannot understand a

' t ;

" metaphor unless one knows the story (or game) that gives the metaphor its
.. ·context. n48

.'

. :'experience.
·employment
i

This necessity to refer to stories is related to the nature of human
Relying on Gerhan and Russell's Metaphoric Process,
of Bernard

Lonergan's

distinction.

Cook

stresses

and their
that human

.'

experience is always interpreted and either immediate (knowledge of objects
·as bodies in their relations to self) or mediate (knowledge of objects as things

46/bid .• p. 392.
41 fbid., p. 393.
48/bid.
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in relation with one another).49

Relying both on Lonergan as well as the

hermeneutical theory of David Tracy,
"implies

the

theoretical

activity

of

Cook
human

states that human experience
minds,

both

of

the

human

community that proceeds and surrounds us and of our own theoretical and
imaginative

capacities. ,,50

Because of the essential "durational" character of

experience in the continuing dialectic between past, present, and future, the
best way to talk about it is to tell stories.
There are a great variety of stories all of which attempt to show us how
the world works.

Cook points out that it is the religious stories characterized

by the tension of myth (stories that set up worlds) and parables (stories that
disturb worlds) and actions (stories that explore the world halfway between
myth and parable) that "give us the opportunity to explore, to rethink, to
stretch the imagination ... 51
distinct, form a unity.

For Cook, symbol, metaphor, and story, although

Symbolic experience must express itself with metaphor

if it is to become meaningful and coherent to human consciousness, and
. ~metaphor must come to narrative expression if it is to come to full contextual
r ,meaning

in human experience.5 2

In returning to Dulles' models, Cook maintains that revelation on the

.·' level
,:.

of primary language is best understood in the interaction between model

'.·: four (dialectical presence) and model five (new awareness).
primarily a correlation between word and faith.53

Revelation is

What is important in this

correlation is the emphasis on divine initiative as well as the involvement of

49/bid.
50/bid.

51 fbid., pp. 394-395.
52/bid., p. 395.
53/bid., p. 398 ff.
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God in human history and experience: "the God who dialogues." The "definitive
example" according to Cook is the death and resurrection of Jesus.

God took the

initiative of sending his son to express the fullness of his love to humanity.
The free human response on the part of Jesus was faithful obedience to the
will of God; on the part of· his contemporaries it was either to accept or deny
God's offering of love.

God's response and initiative in the face of the rejection

was to raise Jesus from the dead expressing a continual initiative of love
Cook says, "The point is twofold, the initiative is always

despite the rejection.

God's (this is what it means to call God Creator, Alpha and Omega), but God's
initiative

is always mediated through the free response of His creatures.

Revelation occurs in this dialectical unity and comes to expression primarily
as

narrated

metaphor. 5 4
11

correspondence

between

Cook points out that Dulles recognizes the close
the

new

awareness

model

and

symbolic

communication.

This model does not view God as an outsider, but rather as one

working

within

from

in the

creative,

unitive, dialogic

process of divine

. initiative and human response.
Cook emphasizes that this metaphoric process is dependent upon the
primacy

of

symbol.

. understanding of the

He

discusses

function

the

of symbol

threefold

process

of Ricoeur's

in the process of interpret ati on

• ,!

'
',:between
the text of a tradition and contemporary experience. 5 5

First, there

must be a precritical and unreflexive experience of symbol in an openness to
what the text might say to the experience of the interpreter.

Second, there

must be a move from a vague, subjective understanding symbol to a more
critical,

conceptual

54/bid •• p. 398.
55 Jbid., pp. 400-401

understanding

formed

by

some

method

(i.e.

biblical
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criticism, historical, literary, etc.).

Cook places Dulles' first three models of

revelation (propositional, historical, experiential) within this second step of
symbolic interpretation.

He notes that these conceptualizations are intrinsic

to revelation, but are subordinate to revelation.
conceptualization
mystery.

can

never

exhaust

the

This is the case because a

possibility

of

content

within

The third and final step is a return back to the symbol.

a

By going

through this process and experiencing the symbol in a new and distinct way,
we experience new possibilities.
back to the first step.
This

With these new possibilities one must return

It is a continual process.

emphasis

on

metaphoric

process

is

essential,

understanding the relationship between the universal
particular

revelation

in

Jesus

By

Christ.

will

for

Cook,

of God

conceptualizing

in

and the

revelation

as

metaphoric process, one can understand the stories, metaphors, and symbols of
Christ in a way that makes them appropriate for humanity as a whole.
focusing

on

these

elements,

. between historical

Cook

gives

elements, outlined by

. /;outlined by Macquarrie.

some
Niebuhr,

depth

to

and

the

By

interrelation

experiential

aspects,

By stressing the need to bring together elements of

, · history and experience, Cook's objectives resemble Kaufman's.

They differ

· . from all our previous analyses in the sense that the focus is on elements of
a

!

'
· . :human

knowing,

analysis

interpretating,

of Tillich

and

and

Pannenberg

understanding
it

hermeneutical elements outlined by Cook.

will

be

revelation.

necessary

to

In

our

identify

the

In the case of Tillich: how is it that

one can know, interpret, and understand being-itself both in history as well as
contemporary experience?
accurately

know,

interpret,

For Pannenberg: what exactly allows people to
and

understand

universal

history?

How

does

story, symbol, and metaphor function in their respective understandings of
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revelation?
Thus we have come from a broad overview of revelation outlined by
Dulles' five models of. revelation. given it some historical perspective with the
analysis

of Baillie and Niebuhr, provided some detail

and depth to the

significant elements involved in the interrelation of history and revelation
with the analysis of Niebuhr, demonstrated the significance of the ontological.
existential elements in revelation by analyzing Macquarrie. shown the value
of correlating both the historical as well as the experienctial aspects of
revelation by focusing on Kaufman, and finally provided a somewhat detailed
description

function

of metaphoric

All of these elements are important factors in attempting to

analyze

comprehend

extremely

complex

as

interpretive theory

experience.

the

in history

in

understanding

and

revelation

elements

important in

revelation .

.! .

of the

well

and

as contemporary

diverse

concept

of

CHAPTER II

ULTIMATE CONCERN AS REVELATION IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL TILLICH

Before attempting to analyze Tillich's understanding of revelation as
the manifestation of ultimate concern. it will be helpful if we first clarify
some of the significant questions which have developed from chapter one
which we will need to bring to our analysis of Tillich's notion of ultimate
concern.

Stemming from Dulles' analysis of revelation we will need to see how

Tillich's notion of ultimate concern relates to the understanding of revelation
as

doctrine.

awareness?

as history,

as

internal

experience,

as dialectic

and

as new

Arising from Niebuhr's analysis we will need to focus on how

·.Tillich attempts to deal with the relativity of one's particular historical point
1

·of view with regard to theological thought?

Also, how is it that Tillich attempts

' . to deal with the universality of faith and the particularities of history?

As a

' ; .result of Macquarrie's analysis of revelation we will need to focus on how
' .'
•
Stemming
: · revelation is mediated by history through ontological categories?
i

,'

from

Kaufman's analysis we will

need to examine how ultimate concern

accounts for the interrelation of historical and ontological elements?

Finally,

arising out of Cook's analysis of the hermeneutical elements of attempting to
grasp revelation conceptually, we will need to see how Tillich's notion of
ultimate concern allows one to know or interpret revelation in both history as
33
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well as contemporary experience?

With these questions in mind we now turn

to Paul Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate concern.
In this analysis of revelation as ultimate concern in the thought of Paul
It is within this

Tillich we will focus, primarily, on his Systematic Theology.

system of thought that the foundational character of revelation as ultimate
concern is described.

In this section I hope to provide an accurate description

of Tillich's understanding of ultimate concern by focusing on the elements of
its ontological structure as well as its interrelations with other elements of his
systematic

thought

which

reveal

significant

aspects

of the

function of ultimate concern as an element of revelation.

meaning

and

Before attempting to

do this, it may be helpful if we outline some of the preliminary objectives,
presumptions

and

criteria

that

function

in

the

thought

of Tillich.

This

introduction will help us to understand the underlying disposition of Tillich's
thought necessary to grasp the overall direction of his systematic analysis of
Theology.
Underlying the whole of Tillich's Systematic Theology,
. ,',that theology functions

is his conviction

between what he calls the "eternal truth"

, · "temporal situation" in which this truth is received.

and the

Thus, Tillich continually

; . strives to address the questions implied within humanity's dynamic situation
·.:'with the answers found by maintaining contact with the essence and identity
of the kergyma within tradition which comes from beyond and is mediated
through experience.

This apologetic or "answering theology,"56 deals with

the interrelation and correlation of questions and answers and provides the
structure of Tillich's simplest ideas as well

as the tremendously

complex

56Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1951), p.

6.
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constructions of entire sections of his work.
On the one hand, the method of correlation must
humanity's existential situation.

focus on

The situation, for Tillich, is not concerned

with the particular state of individual as individual or group as group but
rather with the forms of creative cultural interpretations of these states (i.e.
scientific, artistic, political. etc.).
would

not

be

concerned

with

For example. Tillich explains that theology
mental

illness

psychological

interpretation of the illness. 51

interpretations

are

the

multitude

of

questions

itself but

rather

with

the

Implied within these cultural
of

humanity's

existential

situation.
On the other hand, the method of correlation must focus on what Tillich
calls the "eternal truth."

The source of this answer side is outlined in his two

formal criteria of theology.
ultimate
infinite.

concern.59

The first is that the objects 8 of theology is

It is a concern that is ultimate, unconditional,

and

This ultimate concern can be manifest in every preliminary concern

which becomes an object insofar as it points to ultimate concern (e.g. pictures,
, poems, music, etc.).
, '.emphasis

on

the

What is significant about this first formal criterion is the
infinite

nature of ultimate concern.

It

; ·anything in particular, but particular things can point to it.
ti

can

never be

The second

l·

':'formal criterion establishes the ontological structure of ultimate concern.

In

: it, Tillich describes ultimate concern as "that which determines our being or

511bid .• pp. 3-4.
58The term "object" in this context should be understood as that to which theology directs
itself, not to be confused with a finite "object" existing within the temporal limits of time
and space. This ontological character of ultimate concern will be developed in much
greater detail further in the section.
59 Ibid., p. 12.
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not-being." 6 O

Anything that is of ultimate concern for us must have

influence on our being.

This understanding of "being" is not to be confused

with temporal existence.

Rather, it is that which includes the whole of human

reality-- its structure, meaning, and aim of existence.

I will attempt to

demonstrate that it is Tillich's understanding of ultimate concern understood
as revelation which becomes the foundation of the answering side of his
method of correlation underlying the whole of his theological thought.
These are some of the primary objectives and criteria that are at work
in Tillich's thought.

In what follows, I will attempt to analyze the meaning

and role of ultimate concern in the theological thought of Tillich. I will
generally follow the structure of the five main sections of his Systematic
Theology dealing first with the questions implied in the situation and secondly
with the way ultimate concern functions as the answer.

In several

cases I

have relied on other works of Tillich in order to clarify or add substance to
specific elements of my analysis.

, 'Ultimate Concern and Reason

Within this first section of his system, Tillich attempts to correlate the
'.-:-"

..

;''.questions

implied

in

existence

dealing

with

humanity's

finitude,

self-

estrangement, and the ambiguities of reason with the answers derived from
our

ultimate

concerns.

He

begins

by

pointing

out

that

the

classical

philosophical tradition understood reason as the structure of the mind that
allows one to grasp and transform all aspects of reality (cognitive, aesthetic,

60/bid., p. 14.
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practical, and technical).

According to Tillich, all that remains of this diverse

understanding of reason in the popular mind is the technical aspect which is
concerned with cognitive activity alone.6 1
Tillich
knowledge

makes

and

a

distinction

receiving

between

knowledge.62

what

he

considers

controlling

In controlling knowledge, technical

reason unites subject and object so that the subject can gain control over the
object (detachment).

Because of this detachment, the substance of controlling

knowledge is fairly

secure and objective.

With receiving knowledge, the

subject attempts to take the object into itself (union).
and

object

involves

the

element

of

This union of subject

emotional

participation

whereas

controlling knowledge attempts to separate itself as much as possible.
result

of the

which

stems

focus
from

on union,

receiving knowledge involves understanding

participation

significant. 6 3

ultimately

As a

and

The

gives

it

problem,

the

potential

however,

is

for

that

becoming
controlling

knowledge, although it possesses objective certainty, lacks the potential for
becoming ultimately significant because it lacks the necessary element of
, 'participation.
, '.the

.

element

· .ultimately

On the other hand, receiving knowledge, although possessing
of

participation,

significant,

lacks

and
the

consequently,

certitude

that

the
stems

potential
from

the

for

being

objective

~

·.;'detachment of controlling knowledge.

For Tillich, any attempt to understand a

61systematic., p. 73.
621t is interesting to note the similarity between these two categories of reason with
Heidegger's understanding of the calculative and existential modes of cognitive
experience.
63By "ultimately significant" Tillich means that intimate participation within the object
is a necessary step in allowing the element of being-itself to influence our being. Thus,
receiving knowledge can become our ultimate concern. As we shall see, Tillich maintains
that the fulfillment of complete union is only possible as a result of revelation. See
Systematic, vol. I, pp. 98-100.
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person,

historical

event,

text,

etc.

must

amalgamation

receiving

knowledge

detachment

and

union). 64

The solution of this paradox of reason is found in

structure

of

revelation

as

our

coming

ultimate

together

of

and

ontological

paradoxical

an

controlling

the

(a

involve

concern.

of

Only

revelation can allow the elements of reason to become certain as well as
ultimately

meaningful. 6 5

Thus,
reason. 66
being,

and

reason

is

only

meaningful

as

an

expression

of

ontological

Ontological reason is concerned with the universal structure of
consequently,

rather precedes it and

the

depth

of being. 6 7 It is not reason itself but

is manifest through it.

Ontological reason in the

cognitive realm is concerned with truth itself; in the aesthetic realm, beauty
itself; and in the legal realm, with justice itself.

It is a mystery in the sense

that

of

it

precedes

ontological

reason

the

subject/object

is

understood

structure
as

reality.

revelation.

"The

In

this

word

sense,

'revelation'

('removing the veil') has been used traditionally to mean the manifestation of

1

~omething

hidden

gaining

knowledge. 6 8

which
11

cannot

be

Because

approached
knowledge

through
is

ordinary

dependent

ways
upon

of
the

, ·,subject/object structure of reality, revelation is an experience which cannot

.

; ·be dissolved into it. 69 Thus, even in its manifestation, revelation still remains
,:.

,

:'

. vo.l I, p. 98 .
, ·.· ' 64s ystematzc.,
. 65/bid., p. 105.
66This is Tillich's equivalent to Heidegger's ontological mode of thought. Macquarrie
describes it as thinking which answers to the demand of being.
67 In discussing the ontological element of reason, Tillich necessarily uses metaphoric
language (i.e. being itself, depth, ground, abyss, etc.). The significance of using symbols
and metaphors in discussing revelation as ultimate concern will be explained later in
much greater detail. For now, it is important to recognize that revelatory language is
metaphoric in nature and not to be confused with a literal understanding.
68systematic., vol. I, p. 108.
69/bid., pp. 108ff.
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a mystery.

In a negative sense, mystery is experienced as an abysmal element,

as the threat of non-being.

In the positive sense, it appears as that which

conquers the threat of non-being, it appears as ultimate concern. It is this
sense of mystery

which

becomes the

first

step to

experiencing ultimate

concern.

Only when reason is driven beyond itself out of the subject/object

structure

of reality

to

the

realization

of being

and

non-being

can

one

experience the mystery of ultimate concern.
Revelation is that which concerns us ultimately.
concern

for us

It is

an ultimate

because it concerns the very ground of our being.

If

Revelation exists only as an ultimate concern for a particular individual or
group, then there is no general revelation.

For Tillich, there is no revelation

if there is no one to receive it as an ultimate concern.70

Thus,

revelation

always involves the union of a subjective and objective side: subjectively,
someone is grasped by ultimate concern; objectively, there
grasps someone.

is that which

There is no experience of an ultimate concern without being

'in the state of ecstasy-- literally, "standing outside oneself."
. 1•

The state of ecstasy does not negate reason but is the state of mind in

, · which reason is outside the subject/object structure of reality.

"Ecstasy unites

·the experience of the abyss to which reason in all its functions is driven with

• l·

'
':;the experience of the ground in which reason is grasped by the mystery of its

own depth and of the depth of being generally ... 71
which

ultimate

condition.

concern

manifests

itself within

Ecstasy is the form in

humanity's

psychological

It is important to note that it manifests itself through them and is

not created by them.
10Jbid., pp. llOff.
11Jbid., p. 113

The ecstatic experience of the ground of being in events,
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persons, and things becomes humanity's ultimate concern.
Thus, all reality-- things, people, and events can become the media for
that which concerns us ultimately.
occurrence
between

as

the

Tillich describes the experience of this

a revelatory constellation.? 2 There is a qualitative difference
significance

and

different elements of reality.

truth

of the

revelation

mediated

through

The criteria for this significance is the ability of

the particular aspect of reality to point to its ground and meaning.

For Tillich,

the person represents the central qualities of revelation, and by implication,
all

However,

qualities.

other things can become

supporting elements of

revelation (Tillich uses the example of the power of resisting and enduring in
a stone which is used in the metaphor of God as "rock of ages").
that

all

natural

things

catastrophes, birth, death,
revelation.
Tillich

Finally,

describes

~ransparent

and

events

(e.g.

stars,

plants,

Tillich stresses
people,

natural

danger, etc.) can become media and bearers of

even language can

language

that

enters

become
a

a medium of revelation.

revelatory

constellation

as

language which allows the depth of being and meaning to shine

I

>r ihrough.

This demonstrates his conviction in the mediatory nature of all

, '.reality with regard to revelation.

.·thing
'
/-

Tillich says, "In all these cases it is not the

or the event as such which has revelatory character; they reveal that

':'which uses them as a medium and bearer of revelation ... 7 3

By entering the

special conditions of a revelatory constellation they can become the medium
through which revelation is experienced as an ultimate concern.

12/bid., pp. l 18ff.
13/bid., p. 119.
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Ultimate Concern and Being

In the previous section we focused on Tillich's understanding of reason
It, as well as the

and its interrelation with revelation as ultimate concern.

final section on history, are, in a sense, separate from the central part of the
system.

The epistemological as well as the historical elements of theology are

involved within the whole of the system, but for matters of expediency and
coherence Tillich treats them separately.

Thus section two "Being and God,"

forms the first part of the central structure of his system.

In it, Tillich

analyzes humanity's essential nature (what one ought to be vs. what one is) in
unity with the essential nature of everything that has being.
correlation

between

the

questions

implied

in

the

ontological

There is a
structure

of

finitude with God understood as humanity's ultimate concern.
The ontological question is what is being itself?

In his book, Bib Li cal

Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Tillich discusses the Socratic
"paradox of knowledge" in relation to humanity asking the question of being.
·;Because we ask the question there is something about being which we do not
.

'.

·. possess, otherwise we would not ask the question .

Also, there must be

. .'something of being which we must possess, for, if not, it could not be the
'

..

. ',dbject
'
.~·

of a question.74

Thus, we are somewhat of a mixture of being and non-

being: this is what is meant when we say we are finite.

"He who is infinite

· does not ask the question of being, for, as infinite, he has the complete power
of being.

He is identical with it; he is God."75 In our quest for the "really real"

or the essential substance and meaning of things and people we find ourselves

74Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality
Chicago Press, 1955), p. 11.
75 Jbid., pp. 11-12.

(The University of
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delving into deeper and deeper levels of reality.

In our attempt to discover the

ultimate reality of a thing we discover that it is no longer a thing along side
other things, but rather, it participates in the ground of all levels: the power
and substance of being.

This quest for the ultimate meaning in all things is

the quest for being itself.

It is in being itself that everything that is, can

become an ultimate concern for humanity.

All things are "elements of an
They

encounter, namely, the encounter with the holy.
encounter,

not
0

themselves. 76

as

things

or values,

but as

bearers

are parts of this

of something beyond

This something beyond is described as "the holy, the numinous

presence of that which concerns us ultimately. "7 7

Holiness is the name Tillich

gives to this quality of that which concerns us ultimately.

Ultimate concern is

an experienced phenomenon which can only become actual in the mediation
of being itself through things.7 8
The ontological structure of being as ultimate concern underlies all of
reality; it is present whenever something is experienced.

"The truth of all

~ntological

which

structures

is

their power of expressing

'
·'subject-object
structure possible.
·· '.controlled by it. .. 7 9
;

.·relatively
'
/·

static

that

It is this ontological structure of being which remains a

element

underlying

all

historical

change.SO

argues

universal

that

human

nature

is

dynamic

character of the structure of being,

16/bid., p. 24.
77 Jbid.
18systematic, vol. I, pp. 215-216.
19/bid., p. 169.
80/bid., pp. 163ff

in

history.

humanity

This does not
On the contrary,

·'.mean however that there is a fixed human nature in history.
Tillich

the

They constitute this structure; they are not

, '

..:

makes

is

Despite

this

limited by the
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experience of non-being.

This experience of being limited by non-being is

finitude.
For humanity, the finite limits of time and space participate in the
ontological structure positively as courage and negatively as anxiety. 81

With

the limit of time there is both the anxiety of having to die as well as the
courage of being

in the present moment. 8 2 With the limit of space, there is

the anxiety that stems from

the insecurity of not having an absolute and

certain place to be as well as the courage that comes from affirming one's
being in space at any given moment.

For Tillich, the questions that are

implied in our situation in which we are limited by finitude but yet participate
within

elements

of the

infinite

are

answered

with

the

reality

of

God

experienced as our ultimate concern.
God is the name for that which concerns us ultimately.
does not exist.

In order to exist as a

subject/object structure of finitude.

...

;.

'

,
'

being, God

being God would be limited by the

God is beyond this structure.

~xperience of being itself which concerns us ultimately.83

'.

As a

God is the

Tillich explains:

God would not be God if he were not the creative ground of everything that has
being, that, in fact, he is the infinite and unconditional power of being or, in the
most radical abstraction, that he is being-itself. In this respect God is neither
alongside things nor even 'above' them; he is nearer to them than they are to
themselves. He is their creative ground, here and now, always and everywhere.84

...
· Being itself is the link connecting the finite with the infinite.

It can be

81 fbid., pp. 189ff. Note that Macquarrie as well stresses the the mood of anxiety in the
experience of being. See John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), pp. 86 ff.
8 2For a full discussion of the aspects of anxiety and courage see Paul Tillich, The Courage
to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
83/bid., pp. 205ff.
84systematic, vol. II, p. 7.
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experienced in all things as that which influences the essential structure of
our very being, and consequently, concerns us ultimately.
both that

which

is

experienced

as the infinite,

It functions

the unconditional,

and

as
as

ultimate concern but is manifest through the concrete elements of reality.
Thus,

any

concrete

assertion

about

God,

which

is

forced

to

use

finite

experience and elements, must be symbolic.
Tillich

expresses

distinguishing it from

his

understanding

the term "sign". 8 5

of

by

"symbol"

For him, both a symbol and sign

share in the function of pointing to something beyond themselves.

For the

sign, there is no other function than to represent something else.

This is

illustrated by Tillich with the example of the letter "A" pointing to the sound of
its

pronunciation.

On

the

other

hand,

a

symbol,

although

pointing

to

something other than itself, also participates in the meaning and power of the
reality to which it points.

The example that Tillich uses is a flag that points to

and participates within the reality and power of a king or nation.

Thus,

ultimate concern can only be expressed with symbols that, on the one hand
I

· p,oint

to

it,

but

also

function

and

participate

within

it.

This essential

,, ·~elationship between the use of symbol and ultimate concern is demonstrated
''

; by Tillich's understanding of God.
• !-

He says:

. ''
' :

We could not be in communication with God if he were only 'ultimate being.' But in
our relationship to him we encounter him with the highest of what we ourselves
are, person . And so in the symbolic form of speaking about him, we have both
that which transcends infinitely our experience of ourselves as persons, and that
which is so adequate to our being persons that we can say, 'Thou' to God, and can
pray to him. 8 6

85Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. Robert C. Kimball (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1959), pp. 61ff.
86/bid., pp. 61-62.
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For Tillich, God understood with the symbol of being itself is the underlying
structure of all reality and provides the solution to the problems implied in the
finitude of humanity.

By bridging the gap between our finite limits and the

infinite, the experience of being-itself is one of ultimate concern.

Ultimate Concern and Existence

In the second section we analyzed Tillich's understanding of humanity's
essential nature as manifest in the ontological categories of being. There was a
correlation between the limits of finitude with the presence of God as being
itself.

In this section I will focus on Tillich's analysis of humanity's self-

estrangement within existence (in a sense, what one should not be).

There is a

correlation between the questions that arise out of humanity's self-estranged
existence and the answers that come from the Christ (one who is in existence
but not estranged from

his essence).

Thus, I will

identify the questions

· iimplied in humanity's self-estranged existence and illustrate how Christ .' .
: paradoxically existing in essential being - as the New Being is an ultimate

.

·concern.
' .
. :/
As with being in the state of finitude, being in existence means having

..-~· being
· differ?

that stands out of non-being.87

Naturally, the question is how do they

In finitude, humanity's essential being is separated from self because

the self, bound to the subject/object structure of time and space, is limited by
elements of non-being.

In existence, essential being is separated from self

because of humanity's decision to actualize its potential power of being into

87 Systematic, vol. II, pp. 20ff.
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the finite structure of existence.

For Tillich, potentiality is the power of being

which has not yet realized its power.

All things have being and the potential

to actualize it; only humanity has actualized this potential, and thus, entered
into existence.

Tillich discusses the relationship between the potentiality in

the being of "treehood" and the actualization of the "tree" in his back yard:
Treehood does not exist, although it has being, namely, potential being. But the
tree in my back yard does exist. It stands out of the mere potentiality of treehood.
But it stands out and exists only because it participates in that power of being
which is treehood, that power which makes every tree a tree and nothing else.8 8

The instant some-thing
of existence.

becomes a thing it is actualized into the finite limits

Humanity, possessing the ability to recognize being and its

potential for actualization combined with the freedom and ability to do so, has
chosen to "come into being" (exist).

Tillich points out that this is what the

Genesis creation myth is attempting to convey. 8 9

The serpent, representing

the actualization of the power of being into existence, tempts humanity into
~hoosing to exist apart from its essence (metaphorically illustrated by acting

' .against the God, or essential being).
Tillich does make a further distinction between finitude and existence.
· ; .!le maintains that finitude, in itself, is good, but under the conditions of
. ''
;·'.existential estrangement it is destructive.90 The question: how is it that we can
' · exist limited by finitude and hope to come closer to our essence is answered by
the reality of the Christ.
For

Tillich,

88/bid., p. 21.
89/bid., pp. 39-44.
90/bid., pp. 7lff.

Christ

is

the

"New

Being"

which

conquered

the
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estrangement of existence and paradoxically existed essentially.
"New Being"
between

simply reflects Christ's unique

existence

and

essence.91

ability

to

The term

eliminate the gap

Tillich points out that this is similar to

Paul's use of the term "new creature."

Jesus is the Christ precisely because he

was one-- there is no trace of separation between him and his essential being
(God).

He has finite freedom under the conditions of time and space, but is not

estranged from the ground of his being.
The reality of Christ, for Tillich, cannot be experienced as a result of
historical data alone.

For Tillich, "Faith itself is the immediate (not mediated

by conclusions) evidence of the New Being within and under the conditions of
existence ... 92

Thus, for him, the foundation of Christianity is not historical but

rather existential.

The issue here is the way existential awareness of the

Christ is manifest in present reality as well as in history.
specifically

on the

Later I will focus

role of ultimate concern and history, for now,

it is

important to recognize that Tillich's emphasis is upon faith in the existential
~xperience

of Christ as the New Being rather than historical evidence.

He

I

, .says, "The risk of faith is existential; it concerns the totality of our being while
• · the
~

risk

of

·scientific

•t

historical

judgments

correction ... 9 3

.

·;: understands

historical

is

theoretical

and

open

to

permanent

It is important to keep in mind that Tillich

criticism

as

well

as

philosophy

to

disciplines that attempt an external objective analysis of reality.

be

What makes

Jesus the Christ is the unity of his existence with his essence.
mentioned

before,

9 1Jbid., p. 119.
92/bid., p. 114.
93/bid., p. 117.

essential

being

cannot

be

understood

scientific

And as

objectively;

it
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transcends the subject/object structure of finitude.

Thus, Tillich stresses that

Jesus, as the Christ, can only be experienced existentially in faith.

This

existential experience of Christ as the New Being is what bridges the 2000 year
gap between the original Christian event and the contemporary Christian.9 4
What makes Jesus the Christ ultimately significant for humanity is the
verity of his existence as well as the experience of his essence.
discussing

the

cross

and

resurrection event of Christ it

maintain elements of fact as well as symbol.

is

Thus, in

important to

Facts are needed to convey the

existential elements of the reality of Jesus and symbols are needed to convey
the essential experience of Christ as revelation, being and ultimate concern.9 5
Christ, overcoming the gap between existence and essence gives humanity
ultimate hope and meaning.

This realization of Jesus becoming united with

the New Being in an ecstatic experience is what is conveyed with the symbol
of the resurrection.

r

r.

,

For Tillich, this realization is what characterizes faith.

Faith is based on the experience of being grasped by the power of the New Being
through which the destructive consequences of estrangement are conquered. It is
the certainty of one's own victory over the death of existential estrangement which
creates the certainty of the Resurrection of the Christ as event and symbol; but it
is not historical conviction or the acceptance of biblical authority which creates
this certainty.9 6

..
:.This faith in the experience of the Christ as New Being is of ultimate concern

.

,

for humanity.

It concerns the totality of our very being.

ultimately new toward which history is moving.
end and aim of history.

9 4 Jbid., p. 136.
951 bid., pp. 154ff.
96/bid., p. 155.

It concerns the

Christ as the New Being is the

49

Ultimate Concern and Life

In

section

two,

we

analyzed

Tillich's

understanding

of humanity's

essential nature in the correlation between being and ultimate concern.

In

the last section we focused upon the humanity's estranged existence correlated
with the unity of Christ.

However, these are both abstractions of the complex

interrelation between essential and existential characteristics in reality.

In

this section we will need to analyze Tillich's conception of the complex and
dynamic unity of life.
the

There is a correlation between the questions implied in

ambiguities of humanity's essential nature intertwined within existence

and the answers given by the Spirit which is our ultimate concern.
Tillich

maintains

that

it

is

through

the

evolutionary

process

that

humanity acquired the ability to recognize the potentialities of being and with
it, the freedom to actualize them.97

The inorganic as well as the organic,

grounded in being, has the potential for becoming our ultimate concern; and
:consequently. is of immense theological

However the very

significance.

t

• r .attempt

to recognize these ultimate concerns is distorted by the ambiguities of

, ·,• our existentially estranged condition.

..

• , subject/object
~

structure

of

reality

Because humanity is bound to the finite
there

is

always

the

temptation

of

'::'identifying the particular bearer of an ultimate concern with the ultimate
concern itself.

Tillich refers to this as the demonic. 9 8

The demonic is

manifest whenever there is a distortion of the self-transcendent experience of
an ultimate concern.
transcendence.

The demonic differs from the profane which resists self-

For Tillich, humanity continually strives to overcome these

97 Systematic., vol. III, p. 16.
98/bid., p. 102.

50

ambiguities

of

life

and

seeks

the

unambiguous

This

life.

quality

of

unambiguous life is represented with the symbol of the Spirit.
The Spirit manifests itself in the human dimension of the spirit.

Tillich

defines spirit (with a small "s") as that function of life which characterizes
humanity as humanity and is actualized in morality, culture and religion.99 It
is also understood as the symbol which represents the manifestation of the
Divine Spirit in humanity.

Within the spirit, power of being is united with the

meaning of being and can be defined as the actualization of the power and
meaning of being in unity.

Under the presence of the Spirit, it is the human

spirit which is grasped by ultimate concern and experiences ecstasy.

The

human spirit in life is ambiguous. When this human spirit is grasped by the
Divine Spirit, life becomes unambiguous.

Tillich gives this manifestation of

the Divine Spirit, which creates unambiguous life, the name of faith.
Faith in this sense is the state of being grasped by ultimate concern. IO O
In this sense, all people have faith because all people have ultimate concerns.
'This faith occurs in the dynamics, structure and functions
r .spirit.

of the human

In the receptive character of faith, the human spirit is opened up by

' . the presence of the Spirit.

In faith's paradoxical character, the human spirit

. '

; · accepts the presence of the Divine Spirit despite the tremendous gap between
• !

'

':: them.

And

in

faith's

anticipatory

character,

the

human

spirit

expects

to

participate in the transcendent unity of the unambiguous life created by the
presence of the Divine Spirit. IO I These characteristics of faith

demonstrate

the correlation between the ambiguities in the life of the human spirit and the

99/bid., p. 111.
IOOJbid., pp. 130ff.
101 Jbid., p. I33.
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unambiguous presence of the Divine Spirit which is experienced as ultimate
concern.

Ultimate Concern and History

This final section of Tillich's Systematic Theology,

as with the first

section on reason. is treated somewhat separately from the central portion of
the system (sections 2-4).

Despite the fact that history is a significant element

throughout the whole of the system, Tillich believes it is helpful to treat it
separately.

There is a correlation between the questions

implied in the

ambiguities of history with the answers within the symbol of the Kingdom of
God.

We will first analyze Tillich's understanding of the

historical dimension

in general which belongs to all life processes and realms of life.

Secondly. we

will tum to what Tillich calls "history proper," that is. history which is
dependent on the human spirit and occurs in humanity alone.

We will focus

on the questions implied in both of these aspects of history and attempt to
them with the answers in the element of ultimate concern in the
.· ,'correlate
.
, ·.symbol of the Kingdom of God.
· .

For Tillich, there is a distinction between an historical happening and

• l

•
·.=an historical

event.

Within

reality

there

is

an

inexhaustible

happenings and occurrences that continually take place.

amount of

These happenings

do not become historical events until they are perceived and interpreted by
humanity.

"Every event is a syndrome (a running together) of facts and

interpretation." 102

l 02 Ibid., p. 302.

The bearers and receivers within a particular tradition
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unite the historical happenings with symbolic interpretation.
consciousness"
members

of

generation.

is
a

manifest
tradition

within
that

the

is

memories

continually

and

passed

This "historical

recollections
from

of the

generation

to

The criteria for realizing and accepting a particular historical

happening as an event is dependent upon the particular occurrence's value
and meaning for a particular tradition.

"In this respect history is dependent

on the historical consciousness of a group.

01

l

O3

For Tillich, there are four characteristics of human history.
its connection with purpose.
actions with a purpose.

The first is

A historical event is generally characterized by

The second is its connection with freedom.

By striving

for the possible purposes, humanity transcends the actual situation and is free.
The third is its striving for the new.

All historical events are unique.

And

finally, the fourth characteristic of human history is its universal, particular,
teleological

significance.

Just

how

it

is that a historical

happening is

recognized and interpreted as an historical event with the characteristics of
~uman
.1•

history depends upon a specific criteria or key within a group .
Thus, for Tillich the direct bearers of history are groups of centered

, '.communities.

Because of the limits of finitude they depend upon a particular

.

; · . key to recognize and interpret limitless historical happenings .
/.

. ,..

At this point the question is: Which group and which vocational consciousness are
able to give a key to history as a whole? Obviously, if we try to answer, we have
already presupposed an interpretation of history with a claim to universality; we
have already used the key in justifying its use.
This is an unavoidable
consequence of the 'theological circle' within which systematic theology moves; but
it is and unavoidable circle wherever the question of the ultimate meaning of
history is asked. I 0 4

103/bid., p. 301.
104/bid.
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The

questions

of the

ultimate

meaning of history

that

arise

out

of the

ambiguities in the dimension of history are answered through symbol of the
Kingdom of God which becomes our ultimate concern.
The Kingdom of God has two aspects: an inner historical side which
allows it to participate in the dynamics of history, and a transhistorical side
which answers the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of
history.105

These aspects embrace all aspects of reality.

The central

manifestation of the Kingdom of God is in the appearance of Jesus as the
Christ.

"The metaphor 'center' expresses a moment

in history for which

everything before and after is both preparation and reception." I 0 6

The point

at which the human situation received this manifestation is understood as the
"fulfillment

of

time"--

the

continually experience Kairoi
in particular breakthroughs.

Kairos

to the Kairoi

Kairos.

Tillich

stresses

that

the

Churches

in which the Kingdom of God manifests itself
He defines the relationship between the central

as "the relation of the criterion to that which stands

·under
the criterion and the relation of the source of power to that which is
I
I •

, : nourished by the source of power." I 0 7
;

The awareness of a particular Kairos

is

'not a matter of a detached, objective analysis; but rather, a matter of an
.
. '!b.volved experience. However, observation and analysis do not produce the

.

'·" experience of the Kairos,
objectify

and

clarify

the

they are important to the extent that they help to
experience.

The

fragmentary

victories

of

the

Kingdom of God in history point to the non-fragmentary side of the Kingdom
of God above history.
I 05 lbid.,

p. 357.

I 06 /bid., p. 364.

107 Ibid., p. 370.

For Tillich, it is the central Kai ro s

and the various
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Kairoi

that determine the dynamics of history in its self-transcendence.
The Kingdom of God is also understood as the end of history.

End is

understood in the finite sense as the elimination of history as we know it, and
as the aim toward which the temporal process points to as its goal.

"History is,

so to speak, the earthly realm out of which individuals are moved into the
heavenly

realm. n l 08

For Tillich, history is the process by which humanity

crosses from the temporal realm of finitude to the essential realm of the
infinite.

This end or final goal of history is described as "Eternal Life."

In eternal
balance.

life,

all

polarities of existence

are brought into perfect

There is no longer morality, for there is no "ought to be." What is, is

only what is.

There is no culture, for there is no truth which is not also done.

Finally, within eternal life there is no religion, for religion
humanity's

estrangement

from

its own ground

humanity's existence and essence are one.

of being.

results from

In eternal life,

"The eternal act of creation is

driven by a love which finds fulfillment only through the other one who has
the freedom to reject and to accept love.

God, so to speak, drives toward the

I

: , ~ctualization and essentialization of everything that has being. 11 l 0 9

From this analysis we have seen that Tillich uses the concept of ultimate

.. "·concern to account for the complex and diverse nature of revelation. In
summary. I will refer back to the questions that were posed in the beginning
of the chapter.

First, Tillich's notion of ultimate concern could not fall under

Dulles' model of doctrine as revelation.
of revelation

108/bid., p. 397.
109 Jbid., p. 422.

as

being itself which

For Tillich, the transcendent character
is experienced as humanity's ultimate
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concern can not be identified with any particular thing.

To say that a

particular doctrine is revelation is a misunderstanding which Tillich refers to
as the demonic.
history.

In a similar way, ultimate concern can not be identified with

Tillich recognizes that revelation as ultimate concern is mediated

through historical events, but to confuse the events themselves for the actual
revelation again is a demonic distortion.

Ultimate concern is more closely

linked with Dulles' third model of revelation as personal experience.
Tillich

certainly

recognizes

that

an

ultimate

concern

stemming

Although
from

the

recognition of being itself transcending the subject/object structure of reality
is an internal personal experience, he differs from Dulles' third model by
claiming that ultimate concern is mediated through experience rather than
claiming that it is experience itself. Ultimate concern is also related to Dulles'
fourth model of revelation as dialectical presence.

The concept of ultimate

concern certainly stresses the transcendent otherness of revelation; however,
there is not as much of a void between humanity and God for Tillich.

All

. things are capable of becoming a medium of revelation and all people are
I

'. ·. r • capable
~

of recognizing an ultimate concern.

Whereas the dialectical presence

. model stresses that faith is required for one to be grasped by revelation,

; ~ lillich's stresses that

. .•

is the state of being grasped by an ultimate

Tillich's notion of ultimate concern is most similar to Dulles' fifth

concern.
model

faith

of

revelation

understood

as

new

awareness.

The

experience

of

revelation does not stem from any particular source nor is it identified with
any particular thing; rather, it is an elevation of one's consciousness allowing
the recognition of being-itself to become an ultimate concern.
With

regard

to

the

questions

arising

from

Niebuhr's

analysis

of

revelation, Tillich deals both with the relativity of history as well as with the
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difficulty

of the

revelation.
element

historical

gap

though

Tillich

Even

in

recognizing

by

ultimate

stressing

recognizes
concern,

the
that

he

ontological
history

maintains

is

an

that

mediates is not relative, nor is it in need of being interpreted.

character of
important

what

history

Being itself, by

its very nature goes beyond the subject/object structure of historical events,
people, and documents.

It is here where we see that Tillich is much more

concerned with the end result of revelation and less with the means.
needs to be more detail
elements of history which

explaining the
function

as

interrelation

between the dynamic

a medium for the

conception of revelation as being itself.

There

static, universal

One must question the amount of

significance Tillich gives to history itself.

Clearly he stresses that what

matters is the experience of the divine through history, but this experience is
only possible within history.

Thus, it is just as important to focus on history as

well as the experience of revelation which is manifest through it.
in

the

following

~roviding

a

chapter

detailed

that

Pannenberg

explanation

of how

is
the

much

more

dynamic

We will see

concerned

nature

with

of history

!

r{unctions in the experience of the reality of revelation.
We have seen in this chapter that Tillich has spent much time dealing
; ·with the many issues which we discussed in chapter one with regard to
• ,t
•
": =Macquarrie's understanding of revelation with ontological categories.
Like
Macquarrie, Tillich stresses that revelation occurs as a result of being grasped
by being-itself.

The experience of this ontological reality which is part of all

things, people, and events becomes our ultimate concern.
We have seen that the questions arising from Kaufman's stress on the
interrelation of both historical elements as well as ontological elements were
discussed by Tillich.

He recognizes that history can function as a medium for
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ultimate concern, but lacks the necessary detail explaining the interrelation
between the universal nature of ultimate concern with the relative ways in
which history can be interpreted and understood.
Finally, with regard to the questions stemming from Cook's analysis of
the

hermeneutical

elements

involved

in

attempting

to

overcome

the

gap

between universal faith and particular history with a metaphoric process, we
see that Tillich is not as concerned with the details of how
more

concerned

with

stressing

that

it occurs.

it occurs and much

He rightly recognizes the

ontological, universal structure of revelation as ultimate concern, but in light
of

the

multitude

of

recent

developments

in

historical/critical

and

hermeneutical theory there needs to be a more detailed explanation of the
interrelation between interpretation and revelation.

Wolfhart Pannenberg is

much more concerned with this interrelation.
Thus I will now turn to an analysis of his understanding of revelation as
universal history.
~xperience

We will see that he is much more concerned with how we

revelation

rather

than

exactly

what

we

experience.

After

: , .examining his theory, I will attempt to demonstrate that a more thorough and

.

• complete understanding of revelation is possible by combining elements of
'

''

; ·Tillich's

..
·:·ultimate

stress on the ontological

structure

of experiencing

revelation

as

concern with elements of Pannenberg's focus on the details of how a

universal recognition of revelation is possible in light of recent developments
in

historical/critical

and hermeneutic al

theory.

CHAPTER III

REVELATION AS UNIVERSAL HISTORY IN THE THOUGHT OF
WOLFHARTPANNENBERG

In

attempting

to

grasp

the

way

in

which

Wolfhart

Pannenberg

understands revelation, one is forced to acknowledge the significance he gives
to the term "truth."

It is clear that Pannenberg's understanding of· truth is at

the ground of his understanding of the revelation of God.
facets

to

Pannenberg's

Christ, finitude,

understanding

history, tradition,

of truth:

the

There are many

function

reason, and culture.

of scripture,

There are several

overarching principles which govern and pervade the whole of his thought .
. These principles include eschatology as the key to scripture, to doctrine, and to
: : ·the consummative structure of reality.
~

, trace

these

themes

within

the

In this chapter, we will attempt to

historical

development

of

Pannenberg's

' ~~bought.
•
From the very beginning, and continuing through today. Pannenberg's

..

theology focuses on eschatology as the key which unlocks ultimate meaning
and truth in reality.

Pannenberg's initial focus and concern has been on the

significance of scripture in light of eschatology.

Thus we will begin this

chapter by taking a brief look at the role of eschatology and scripture and how
they function as elements of universal history.
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Following this emphasis on
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scripture, Pannenberg focuses
eschatology.
Jesus

Christ

on the significance of doctrine in light of

Thus we will look at the role of eschatology and the doctrine of
and

how

they

function

as

elements

of

universal

history.

Following this emphasis on doctrine, Pannenberg focuses on the significance
of the consummative structure of reality in light of eschatology.

This focus on

the consummative structure of all reality continues today and is the most
recent position taken by Pannenberg.

Thus, we will conclude this chapter by

looking at the role of eschatology and the various elements of reality in its
consummative structure as universal history.

Revelation as Scripture and Eschatology

With regard to the interpretation of scripture, Pannenberg stresses that
Christianity

must

struggle

to

unify

the

particular

revelation

of

Christ

available in scripture, and the general, universal revelation of God in all
ihings.110
'.- r rheology
'

' ,the
'

Pannenberg

notes

two

significant

problems

which

modern

must face with regard to itself and scripture: on the one hand there is

distance

between

a

literal

interpretation

of

immediate historical content; on the other is
. ·"'
: ·contemporary theology and primitive theology ,111
• .l

scripture
the

and

distance

its

own

between

Pannenberg emphasizes

that the texts of the Bible must be understood primarily in relation to their
immediate environment.

The exegetical task is to interpret scripture first as it

was intended by its authors for its readers.

The problem is to bridge the gap

that exists between the actual history of Jesus and the multiple New Testament
1 lOBasic., vol. I, p. 1.
l 11 tbid., p. 6.
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interpretations of it, on the one hand; and, on the other, the gap between the
intellectual milieu of the New Testament and ours.112 For Pannenberg, these
connections are possible within the horizon of the process of history itself.
focusing

on

the

whole

of

reality

present

in

universal

history

By

which

encompasses the true place (sitz im Leben) of the various authors of scripture
as well as the contemporary world one can attempt to bridge the gap.

In

discussing the act of interpreting the text of the New Testament Pannenberg
says,
Only a conception of the actual course of history linking the past with the present
situation and its horizon of the future can form the comprehensive horizon within
which the interpreter's limited horizon of the present and the historical horizon of
the text fuse together .1 1 3

This is the only way the past and present horizons can be maintained in their
uniqueness. For Pannenberg, all things, events, and people are part of a
comprehensive continuity of history.

Pannenberg's understanding of history

is not primarily concerned with either the record of past events, or the
; chronological record of events,

'

,

but rather with the inquiry and discovery of a

; universal, comprehensive, continuity of meaning which connects all things,
. . events,

and

people.114

This unity is understood as the wholeness of truth

• ,t

.•~which is partially manifest within the collective consciousness of humanity.

l 12/bid., p. 8.
l 13/bid., p. 129.
114 In briefly looking at the etymology of the term "history. n it is interesting to note the
similarity between Pannenberg's understanding of the word with the Latin and Greek roots
meaning-- inquiry, knowing, and learning. For Pannenberg, it is a universal sense of
history which discloses the meaning of events.
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Revelation as Doctrine and Eschatology

For Pannenberg, what is essential to any study of Christ is the emphasis
on

who Jesus was.

This focus should be concerned with unfolding the

Christian community's confession which is grounded in the activity of Jesus in
the

past.115

In the midst of this past, Pannenberg sees the tremendous

eschatological hope that was such an integral part of primitive Christianity,
and which continues to remain a primary characteristic of the Christian faith.
He says, "Thus the task of Christology is to establish the true understanding of
Jesus' significance from his history, which can be described comprehensively
by saying that in this man God is revealed. 116
11

For Pannenberg,
resurrection

stems

from

the

primary

significance of the

the eschatological hope

which

event of Christ's
it

fulfilled.

The

experience of Jesus after he was dead was understood as an experience of the
end (recalling the Greek eschatos
~ignificance

.'./conviction
..
·,

meaning "last" or "farthest").

The profound

that the early Christians found in the resurrection event was the
that

it was

bound

to the

last event in history

(es ch at on) .

~'

Pannenberg concludes that "the eschatological event of the appearance of
·'
, Christ is the summation of the universe from its end in that this event has
• .l

•

/consummating

power

in

the

fullness

of

time."11 7

This event has

consummating, or final power, in the fullness, or overall whole of reality.

It is

this final and future event of history which allows humanity to understand
the essence and meaning of all individual occurrences whose "meaning is
115wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus • God and Man (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
1968), p. 28.
116/bid., p. 30.
111 Jbid., p. 388.
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relative to

the

whole to

which

it belongs. l l 8

"Through giving up its

11

particularity, everything is mediated

with

the whole and, transcending

its

finitude, with God, who nevertheless wanted this particularity to exist within
the whole of his creation." 119

We derive the words with which we speak of the

eschatological reality that has appeared in Jesus from the experience of a
reality that is not yet the reality of the eschaton.

For this

statements of Christology have only metaphorical meaning.

reason,

all

They are valid

only to the extent that they are motivated by thinking through the history of
Jesus.

They are always only exegesis of the history of Jesus and remain in

need of expansion and correction in the light of the eschatological future.
Only the eschaton
resurrection

from

will ultimately disclose what really happened in Jesus'
the

dead.

Until

then,

we

must

speak

favorably

in

thoroughly legitimate, but still only metaphorical and symbolic, form about
Jesus' resurrection and the significance inherent in it.12 0
As a result of the profound effect this eschatological expectation had
1;1pon

history,

climaxing

in

the

experience

of the

resurrection

of Jesus,

: r J>annenberg concludes that the event of the resurrection should be understood
~

.as a historical event.

. ...

In his well known work Jesus- God and Man,

he says:

·- ,£:

Thus the resurrection of Jesus would be designated as a historical event in this
sense: If the emergence of primitive Christianity, which, apart from other
traditions, is also traced back by Paul to appearances of the resurrected Jesus, can
be understood in spite of all critical examination of the tradition only if one
examines it in the light of the eschatological hope for a resurrection from the dead,
then that which is so designated is a historical event, even if we do not know
anything more particular about it.1 2 1

118/bid.,
119 /bid.,
120/bid.,
l 21 /bid.,

p. 391.
p. 396.
p. 397.

p. 98.
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Out of the early Christian's eschatological hope, which was generated by a set
of historical circumstances, arose the powerful understanding and experience
of Jesus Christ after
an experience

he was dead.

Pannenberg stresses that this was certainly

which had significant historical repercussions.

It is in this

sense that the event of the resurrection is to be thought of as a historical
event.
Pannenberg's understanding of history is tied with the experience of
humanity
much

which goes far beyond the more narrow, focused

of

contemporary

Pannenberg

says,

"The

science

designates

judgment

about

as

reality.

whether

an

In

emphasis that
this

event,

respect
however

unfamiliar, has happened or not is in the final analysis a matter for the
historian and cannot be prejudged by the knowledge of natural science.122 It
is not that Pannenberg discredits the results and truth of the disciplines of
science, but stresses that it is in the very nature of science to "declare its own
~nability

to make definitive judgements about the possibility or impossibility

I

:. r .of

an individual event, regardless of how certainly it is able, at least in

.
' ,principle,

;

to

measure

the

probability

of an

event's

occurrence."123

For

Pannenberg, it is in the very nature of history to focus on a broader horizon

•.4

.:fof
•"'

experience

than

any

scientific

analysis.

Historical

analysis is

more

inclusive and comprehensive, whereas scientific analysis is more particular
and precise.
Because the event of the resurrection is understood from a historical
point of view rather than a scientific one, it can only be expressed in the
122/bid.
I23lbid.
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metaphoric language of eschatological expectation.

The experience of Jesus

after he was dead, is expressed using the metaphor of a resurrection from the
dead.

There is no scientific certainty, nor any complete understanding of

what exactly happened 2000 years ago, except for the fact, verified by much
historical testimony, that the tremendously profound reality of Jesus was, and
continues to be, experienced.

Pannenberg points out that this mythological

way of describing and thinking about experience "has come increasingly into
conflict

with

the

scientific

understanding of the

world

become a dead weight hindering the Christian message." 124

and

has

thereby

He goes on to say

that "even the element of truth in the myth can be made valid today only in a
way of thinking that is, in principle, unmythological." 125

For this reason,

thinking about the point of departure for theology in terms of historical
events

is

increasingly

important

in

modem

times.

This

shift

from

a

mythological to a historical way of understanding truth allows Pannenberg to
express

the

reality

of religious

culture can understand.

truth

in

a language

which

contemporary

This shift in language is acceptable because it still

I

: manages to point to the ultimate reality which is expressed by the original
'
"myth.

'

Pannenberg is concerned with the language which the contemporary
,

•"'

;world uses to think and struggles to understand itself.
understanding

oneself in

mythological

terms

to

What has changed by

understanding

oneself in

terms of historical fact and scientific verification may not be the truth of the
early

Christian experience, but simply the language and terms themselves

which we use to think about and understand our experience.

124/bid., p. 186.
125 Jbid., p. 186.

Rather than
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attempt to rehash the validity and the truth inherent in the mythological way
of understanding reality, Pannenberg has provided a re-evaluation of what
history and science mean in light of experience in general, and the early
Christian experience of Jesus' resurrection in particular.

Pannenberg hopes

this focus will allow contemporary culture to grasp meaning in the more
comprehensive view of history.
to

He, like Tillich, finds it increasingly difficult

express meaningful experience in modern symbols and language.126

modern

culture,

understanding

the

the

development

world

and

of

reality

more
have

inclusive,
become

broader
extremely

ways

In
of

urgent.

Pannenberg's solution is understanding the world from the point of view of a
universal

history.

Revelation as Consummative Reality and Eschatoloi:y

Universal History and Truth

For Pannenberg, the primary characteristic of what Christians call God

•. r,

.

.., is the universal unity of truth within past, present, and future experience of
..
~
all reality.
Thus, in an attempt to understand his view of revelation as

..

11.:.

'::universal history, it is necessary to begin with his broader understanding of
truth in general.

In volume two of Pannenberg's Basic Question in Theology

he begins his article, "What is Truth?,"

by saying, "The Question about the

truth of the Christian message has to do with whether it can still disclose to us

126"Since the split between a faith unacceptable to culture and a culture unacceptable to
faith was not possible for me, the only alternative was to attempt to interpret the symbols
of faith through expressions of our own culture." see Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology,
(University of Chicago, 1963), vol. III, pp. 4-5.
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today the unity of the reality in which we live" _12 7 According to Pannenberg,
it is that characteristic of the Christian message which allows one to grasp the
unity of reality which has been present from the beginning and is chiefly
responsible for the success of Christianity.

He stresses that what is at the core

of Christianity is not a variety of particular truths, but truth itself, "which in
essence can only be one." 12 8
"constancy,"

Pannenberg refers to this aspect of truth as its

which is understood as the agreement of truth with itself.

In

Pannenberg's view, this understanding of truth is grounded both in Hebrew as
well as Greek thought.

For the Hebrews, the unity of truth was evident in

their confidence and faith in the constancy of the self-disclosure of Yahweh.
The Greeks, on the other hand, looked toward the constancy of truth by
focusing on its agreement with itself.

For Pannenberg, this element of the

constancy of truth and its self-disclosure, demonstrates the necessity for its
unity. 129

This understanding of truth as a unified, constant revelation is the

substance of any theology.

The very task of any systematic theology is

essentially bound to the "construction of the path of the revelation of God and,
1

.·· r .thus, of the unity of truth." 1 3 0
This unity of truth is one with reality which, for Pannenberg, exists
throughout all of history and is not simply in present, empirical happenings,

.

~#

.·:as much of modern science maintains.131

For Pannenberg, this unity of truth

is concerned with everything real, and thus cannot only be limited to things

127wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1970), vol. II, p. 1.
128/bid.
129/bid., p. 11.
130 Ibid., p. 16.
131see Alfred J. Ayer, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (London: Macmillian &
co., 1962), especially pp. 78ff.
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of the present world.132

"Its unity should instead also embrace the peoples

and cultures of distant times, for whom the whole of reality presented itself
differently from the way it does for us today." 13 3

Thus, for Pannenberg, truth

necessarily takes on a historical aspect: truth itself has a history.
truth itself which functions as the substance of history.

In fact, it is

"Historical change

itself must be thought of as the essence of truth if its unity is still to be
maintained

without

narrow-mindedly

the whole of truth."134

substituting a particular perspective for

The problem here is the two handed necessity of

isolating particular aspects of truth when referring to particular events and
individuals

of the

present

or

past,

while

maintaining

the

sense

of

the

wholeness of truth that is essential if any attempt to grasp the meaning of any
of the particulars is to be made.
For Pannenberg, Hegel's system is the best example to date of a solution
to this problem.135

For Hegel, truth was not viewed as a particular product

already complete, but rather as the process of history itself.
~overns

the movement of the truth through history

For Hegel, what

is the absolute.

The

t

: . r ~efinitive

.

difference between Hegel's and Pannenberg's views of the unity of

., ' truth within

history

;· eschatology.136

..

»

is

Hegel's exclusion and Pannenberg's inclusion of an

Pannenberg's

most

significant

criticism

of

Hegel's

~

; :conception of the unity of truth is directed to his failure to provide any means
1321n order to understand Pannenberg here, it is necessary to understand what he
understands to be "real." For him, the "real" is not bound to sensory experience of the
present moment, nor even in thoughts and ideas within the present moment. Pannenberg's
understanding of reality is bound with his understanding of truth. What is real, for
Pannenberg, is truth in itself which stretches the span of history.
133 fbid., p. 20.
134 fbid., p. 20.
135 fbid., p. 21.
136For a look at Hegel's view see G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind tr. J.B.
Baillie, intro. George Lichtheim (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 82.
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of understanding the whole of truth.

For Pannenberg, any conception of the

unity of truth is dependent upon a view of its future.

This future orientation,

or eschatology, provides the necessary wholeness to any view of the truth as a
unity.
Pannenberg points out that for Christians, it is Jesus' resurrection from
the dead which provides a sense of the whole of reality and truth by providing
a glimpse of the end. This solution is satisfactory because it "protects the
openness of the future and the contingency of events, and still holds fast to
the ultimacy of what appeared in Jesus, which makes possible the unity of
truth." 131

Only by viewing truth with a past, present, and future is the

meaning and essence of any of the particulars of experience evident. This
view of the whole comes about through the process of history itself.

In effect,

it is history itself which reveals more and more of the whole and thus gives
more and more substance and meaning to all of the particulars of reality.
order

to

~schatology

gain

a

better grasp

of the

essential

function

In

of Pannenberg's

in his view of truth, it will be helpful if we tum to a more detailed

~

·

r~nalysis

of the role and function of Christ in his thought.

..
Universal History and Hermeneutic

"'~

For Pannenberg, any understanding of events or people of the past or
present is dependent on the breadth and comprehensive view of a universal
history.

In discussing interpretation

from

the perspective of a universal

history, Pannenberg points out the need for a more comprehensive
events

and

131/bid., p. 26.

individuals.

"Even

significant

individual

view of

occurrences

and
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historical

figures

continuities

that

require
extend

for

their

beyond

evaluation

a

view

their narrower life-setting

of

the

and

broader

epoch." 1 3 8

For Pannenberg, the significance of an individual or event is directly related
to the comprehensiveness with which one relates it with other events and
individuals.

This allows one "to do justice to its true significance." 139

In order

to get at the meaning of past events and people, as well as current events and
people, it is necessary to place them in the continuity of meaning in which
they stand.

Pannenberg says, "If the historical distance of what happened in

the past is retained, then the link connecting the events and forms of the past
to the present can scarcely be found anywhere else than in the continuity of
history

itself

which

joins

today

with

yesterday."140

In order for this to

happen, Pannenberg stresses that it is necessary to expand one's horizon to
encompass the past, the present and that which joins them both.
The attempt to understand tradition is similar to the construction of a
bridge.
~he

In constructing this bridge, one is concerned with the construction of

whole of reality which is necessary in order to understand that aspect of

•

culture.

For Pannenberg,

~,' speaking about the whole of reality and speaking about

God are not two

' vreality

which

is

tied

with

past

tradition

and

.

..entirely
,.
....

'real,

different matters, for they mutually condition each other.

true,

whole, unified,

and

"all-determining reality

What is

is then - if it be

personal - to be thought of as the God of this history." 14 1
As discussed above, what is also essential in attempting to understand
past or present events is the projection of the future.
138Basic., vol. I, p. 98.
139/bid.
14 0/bid., p. 113.
141/bid., pp. 156-57.

Only by viewing history
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in its wholeness, based on the eschatological conception of the future in
Christ, can we attempt to gain a better understanding of meaning within all of
reality.

Humanity's finitude stands in the way of a complete and infinite

understanding of history and reality.

The problem arises when attempting to

speak of a universal history while maintaining the starting point of human
finitude: Universal history implies full view of the end-- if this is so, there is
no need to discuss human finitude. These limits with which humanity must
live results in a less than absolute, finite perspective of the world.

For

Pannenberg,

the

humanity's

finite

condition

renders

any

conclusion

truth and meaning of universal history to be questionable.14 2

about

It is the task of

humanity to continually attempt to understand all of reality in light of a
universal
always

r,

history,

while

continually

recognizing

that

the

conclusions

are

provisional.
In reflecting on the provisional character of our knowledge of the end of history,
the horizon of the future could be held open and the finitude of human experience
preserved.
It is precisely this understanding of history as something whose
totality is given by the fact that its end has become accessible in a provisional and
anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from the history of Jesus in its
relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition.14 3

' ,J~y maintaining a provisional knowledge, the horizon of the future can be left
. ·open while preserving humanity's finite condition.

142/bid., p. 133.

14 3Ibid., p. 135.
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Universal History and Faith and Reason

Pannenberg, in his essay Faith and Reason,

begins with this question:

Is it perhaps the case that even the tension between faith and reason is possible
only on the presupposition of a unity which encompasses both, namely, the
presupposition of the unity of truth? 14 4

This question suggests his belief that his theory on universal history (whose
foundation is characterized by the "unity of truth") is the bridge which can
also

link

the

tremendous

gap

that has

existed

between

faith

and

reason.

Pannenberg believes that a religious subjectivity exists in our society as a
result of the neglect of positivistic science to include this aspect of humanity.
For this reason "the task of a rational account of the truth of faith has
acquired

urgency

in the

modern

period." 14 5

At the heart of Pannenberg's

theory of universal history is the maxim that every individual experience has
its meaning only in connection with life as a whole.
'

,.,we

Because of the fact that

are unable to stand at the end of history, a conception of the future is

''

; necessary in order to

recognize meaning in any individual event.14 6

conception must link the future with the present and the past.
!ll\'.l:

~sums

This

Pannenberg

it up in this way:

Only from such a fore-conception of a final future, and thus of the still unfinished
144wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1971), vol. II, p. 47.
145/bid., p. 53.
l 461 realize that we have discussed the role of eschatology with regard to truth and Christ
in the above sections; however, because Pannenberg's eschatology again plays a _significant
role in this section with regard to the relationship between faith and reason, I felt a brief
reiteration, applied to the topic at hand, would be helpful.
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wholeness of reality, is it possible to assign to an individual event or being - be it
present or past - its definitive meaning by saying what it is. Thus, when someone
names a thing and says, "This is a rose," or "this is a dog," he always does so from
the standpoint of an implicit fore-conception of the final future, and of the totality
of reality that will first be constituted by the final future. For every individual
has its definitive meaning only within this whole.141

For

Pannenberg,

it

is

not

faith

alone

which

is

dependent

upon

an

eschatological basis in the future.
A conception of the future is also an essential element for reason as
well.

By maintaining an eschatological conception of the future it is possible

to place the meaning of everything individual in a context of meaning which
allows us to say what this is or that is.

Pannenberg stresses that it is not true

that "reason, in contrast to faith, has to do only with what is visible."148

In

the realm of reason, the process of creativity, stemming from imagination, is a
result of a conception of the future. For Pannenberg, reason is ultimately
concerned with only present things.

However, it derives its ability to speak

meaningfully about those present things from an eschatological emphasis that
faith puts on the future.
~·

This emphasis allows for the recognition of meaning

in present things giving reason its very origin.

Conversely, the creative

• , imagination, stemming from reason's conception of the future things. allows
.Jaith to talk of the eschatological future of individuals, humanity and of the
, world as a whole.

Thus. it becomes clear that for Pannenberg, faith and

reason mutually assist one another.

It is eschatology which functions as the

link binding the two together.

Reason gives rational substance to conception

of universal

from

history

stemming

faith's

stress

on

the

unity of truth

existing wholeness of reality (past, present, and fore-conception of future).
14 7 Basic., vol. IT, p. 62.
14 8/bid., p. 63.
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Faith, on the other hand can assist reason to focus more on the true meaning
of present things by its orientation toward a final eschatological future which
gives wholeness to the unity of truth necessary to grasp the meaning of any
individual

thing.

This
referring,
God.

whole of reality or universal history to which
is

not

completely

different

from

Pannenberg's

we have been

understanding

of

He believes they mutually condition one another. "God is immanent in

history

in the process of the transmission of his eschatological revelation,

determining it in its totality from
the history of Jesus." 14 9

For Pannenberg, this all determining reality, if it be

thought of as personal- is God.150
grasp

within, from the intra-historical event of

In the process of continually attempting to

the continuities of meaning that exist in

a universal conception of

history, one can experience the ultimate, profound, personal revelation of God.

Universal History and God

.•
>

Pannenberg correctly points out that the very term "God" has appeared
to become "dispensable" and even an "interference" in this day and age of
science

and

technology .15 1

Western culture, particularly, has increasingly

"

been relying on scientific, empirical evidence to give substance to the whole
of reality,

but

as

a

result,

has

experienced

a loss

of personal

identity.

Pannenberg, who sees God as one who provides a supportive framework which
gives substance and meaning to human life, there is a crisis in the modem

149/bid., p. 58.
150/bid., pp. 156-57.
151/bid., p. 201.
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world.

There is a growing absence of meaning and substance in contemporary

human

life.
The problem, for Pannenberg, began in the eighteenth century and is

primarily

concerned

with the

difficulty

in understanding

God

as

determining power, on one hand, and as a person, on the other.

the

all

"Every

concept of person conceived in this way includes within itself the finitude of
man as constitutive element, and therefore is unfit as a designation of the
infinite power that determines all reality." 15 2

The problem is concerned with

thinking of God as personal without implying the finite limits which define
humanity's

conception

understanding of God

of
as

person.15 3
"being itself'

Pannenberg

stresses

that

strongly emphasizes the

Tillich's
limitless,

infinite characteristics of God, but neglects in showing how God can be
personal at the same time.
For Pannenberg, the answer is found in eschatology. Because the future
provides the necessary missing link to the universal, whole of reality which,
for Pannenberg is the revelation of God, God exists as the power of the future
ever the present.
As the power of the future, God is no thing, no object presently at hand, which man
could detach himself from and pass over. He appears neither as one being among
others, nor as the quiescent background of all beings, the timeless being
underlying all objects.15 4

152/bid., p. 227.

15 3 It is very interesting to note that Pannenberg suggests a reversal in the common
understanding of the issue in that "there is evidence for the view that the phenomenon of
the personal was not first discovered in relation to man, but had its origin in religious
experience, in the appearance of the numinous object, and was transferred to man only
from there." see p. 245.
I54Basic., vol. II, p. 242.
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Pannenberg's eschatological solution attempts to remove the category of being
all together.

God's full revelation will only occur at the end of time, finitude,

and history, when humanity can view reality in its wholeness and totality.

In

a sense, Pannenberg maintains the simultaneous yes and no position with
respect to God.

God is present and active in the present, but only as the

conception of the future in unity with the present and past.

It is as if we can

experience God only in a partial, incomplete, not yet way.

In contrast to

Tillich, Pannenberg suggests that "being" is to be thought of from the point of
view of the future rather than as the ultimate, abstract presence in all things.
"Man

participates

in

God

not

by

flight

from

the

world

but

by

active

transformation of the world which is the expression of the divine love, the
power of its future over the present by which it is transformed in the
direction of the

glory of God. l 5 5
11

We will turn now to an analysis of

Pannenberg's understanding of God with relation to religion in general.

Universal History and Religion

In attempting to understand the phenomenon of religion, Pannenberg
.~tresses

that humanity is composed of historical beings who change with the

process of history and thus he maintains that only a study of the history of
religion

can

provide

an

adequate

describing one's relationship

analysis

of religious

with the divine,

experience. I 5 6 In

Pannenberg suggests that it

belongs to one's structure to presuppose a mystery of reality which transcends
one's own finitude and which allows oneself to relate to this mystery as the

155 Jbid., p. 248.
156/bid., p. 78.
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fulfillment of one's own being.
What is at stake for man in his being referred to that mystery is essentially the
wholeness of his own being and therefore of the universal truth that unites all
men, as well as the unity of the world and the correspondence of his existence with
this, it follows that this mystery will confront him particularly in events which
illuminate a wider range of his experience of existence and in fact will encounter
him as a power over at least one aspect of his existence and of his world as a whole.
157

For Pannenberg, happenings of divine reality are historical events.

He says,

"As powerful events they - or the power experienced in them - illuminate the
experience

of existence

of the

men

who

encounter

such

happenings." 1 5 8

Religions are concerned with this reality which is encountered as experience
If this experience

in its totality as the unifying unity which is the world.
11

manifests itself in a personal mode, it is called "God. 159
significant differences

between

Tillich's

experiences

as

reality,

and

experiences

God

divine
as

structure of history.

manifest

in

ontological

Pannenberg's
the

world

by

Here we see one of the
on

what

one

show

how

one

emphasis

effort

to

focusing

on

the

universal

For Pannenberg, it is one's particular historical situation

which shapes the conceptions of the divine.160

Naturally, political or social

differences and changes in culture play a great role in this since religion is
•· ·'*

£oncerned with understanding the world in its wholeness.
In the face of a growing awareness of the shear multiplicity which

151 Jbid., p. 104.
158/bid., p. 105.

15 9The substance is elaborated by Tillich's ontological focus on being - the manifestation
of it is elaborated by Pannenberg's focus on the universal structure of history.
160This theme relates to Tillich's method of correlation - for Tillich it is humanity's
particular situation which shapes the question that one asks - it is the Christian tradition
which provides an answer. For Pannenberg, it is the historical situation which shapes
both the questions one can ask as well as the answers that arise.
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exists with regard to the variety of religions and cultures both in the world
today as well as the past, Pannenberg asserts that "it should be tested in every
case to what extent the underlying experience of the divine mystery expressed
in a religious phenomenon is able to illuminate the reality of existence as it
was

experienced

and as it presents itself in contemporary experience,

and

therewith to confirm its

then

claim

to

open

up

an

access to the

divine

mystery." 161

Universal History and Secular Culture

In his book Christianity in a Secularized World ,
on the

work of the

Pannenberg, relying

American sociologist Peter Berger,

suggests that the

process of the development of secular culture in the sense of the constant
advance of 'modernization' necessarily comes up against inner limits.162

This

theory maintains that secularization cannot count on an unlimited increase as
Max Weber had previously assumed.

Berger believes that the inner limit of

,. secularization exists as the individual's need for a meaningful life.

He says,

"individuals need to interpret the reality in which they live in a meaningful
,,~ay, in order to be able to feel that their own life is meaningful." 16 3

The greatest difficulty with a secularized culture is in its inability to
allow individuals to recognize meaning in their lives.
stems,

primarily,

from

contemporary workplace.

an

anonymous

atmosphere

This characteristic
that

exists

in

the

By playing their particular roles in the workplace,

161 Ba sic., vol. II, p. 118.
162wolfhart Pannenberg, Christianity in a Secularized World
1989), p. 28.
163 Jbid., p. 29.

(New York: Crossroad,
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individuals remain largely anonymous.
growing

complexity

that

exists

Also, few are able to perceive the

between

their

particular

significance and interconnections with the whole of society.

life.

which

regards the

and

its

Thus, again a

sense of anonymity exists with respect to entire social system.
bureaucratic control over social

job

Further, the

individual

as

an

abstract category and neglects to take note of one's particular individuality,
reinforces this situation.

Finally, the pluralization of the world, the division

between public and private spheres, and the plurality of institutions within
the public sphere, which become individual worlds in themselves, lead to a
disintegration of the world as a whole.

Whereas religion used to function as a

way of maintaining integration in life, the whole of the burden has been
This situation, according to Berger,

placed increasingly on the individual.

leads to frustration, crisis of identity. and the feeling of "homelessness" in the
social world.

Even religion itself has lost its ability to provide integration and

wholeness in family life and culture because of the increasing awareness of
religious plurality.

For Pannenberg, the question is:

Whether there can be a renewal of the context of our culture with its religious
origins which preserves the values of the modem cultural development while at the
same time taking more notice of the Christian shaping of our cultural and political
life and restoring its validity as an index of the identity of our culture?l 64

For Pannenberg there is hope.

He suggests that the most obvious and

effective way of achieving this would be to strengthen the identity of our
culture by focusing on its religious roots.

What is necessary is the return of

the view that God is the creator of the world and thus all phenomena of finite

164/bid., p. 38.
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reality, including human being, is appropriately understood only in light of
its relationship to God.

This, for Pannenberg, is "the principal counter-

position to the secular consciousness which theology

has to develop

and

defend in critical dialogue with the natural sciences and the humanities. I 6 5
11

He goes on to say that "theology, in dialogue with the sciences, has the task of
demonstrating in specific terms the dimension which has thus been omitted
from

the phenomenon which the sciences are investigating, through which

these phenomena are associated with God as the creator of the world.
Pannenberg

maintains

that

he

has

attempted

to

do

the

same

with

11

I
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the

humanities and strongly believes that it is also possible with the natural
sciences.

Finally he stresses that

The opportunity for Christianity and its theology is to integrate the reduced
understanding of reality on the part of the secular culture and its picture of
human nature into a greater whole, to offer the reduced rationality of secular
culture a greater breadth of reason, which would also include the horizon of the
bond between humankind and God.16 7

It

is this task which Pannenberg's theory of universal

history strives to

accomplish.

'j

By

beginning

with

truth

and

moving

through

Christ,

hermeneutic,

faith and reason, God, and religion, we have analyzed the significant aspects of
Pannenberg's understanding of universal history as revelation.

In the final

section, we briefly looked at the practical application of Pannenberg's theory
of universal history to secular culture.
165 /bid., p. 52.
166/bid., p. 52.
1611bid., p. 57.

In the next and final chapter we will
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examine both Tillich's understanding of revelation as ultimate concern and
Pannenberg's understanding of revelation as universal history in light of our
initial analysis of revelation in the first chapter.

After a more objective

analysis of their thought is made we will look at them together and consider
the

possibility of using

significant elements of both to

provide a more

adequate understanding of the revelation of God in the world today .

.'

CHAPTER IV

REVELATION AS UNIVERSAL ULTIMATE CONCERN IN HISTORY

As I have maintained throughout, all theological thought has a theory
of revelation as its foundation.

In focusing on the unveiling of the divine,

any thought of revelation must ask who, what, where, when, why and how?

It

is clear from the first chapter that the various understandings of the answers
to

these

questions

are tremendously

diverse,

almost

revelation is simply too complex and unknowable to

chaotic.

Is

it that

adequately define in

conceptual terms, or have the many attempts to devise a theory which attempts
to define and explain the experience of this reality been erroneous?
third alternative.

There is a

I am convinced that knowing is a process; a process that will

continue as long as we are bound by the limiting constraints of finitude.
Humanity continually strives to grasp the answers to the questions implied in
I

the experience of all reality.
provisional

At best, however, these answers are only

in the sense that they

apprehended.168

look

ahead

or beyond that which

is

Despite the fact that we are unable to grasp the meaning of

any experience fully, we continually strive to establish increasingly adequate
theories that attempt to do so.

Why?

Beside the will to survive, the desire to

168The Latin videre means to see -- providere

81

means to see ahead.
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understand is among our strongest attributes.
In this final chapter I will attempt to provide a helpful contribution to
this process within contemporary theological thought about revelation.

I will

begin by focusing on the initial analysis of revelation in chapter one and
attempt to identify the

significant elements that any

theory

attempting to

adequately account for the experience of revelation should contain.

I will

then evaluate the understanding of revelation as ultimate concern in Tillich
and universal history
pointing

out

understand

those

the

in Pannenberg in light of this previous examination,
elements

experience

which

are

most

helpful

of revelation and those which

represented in their thought.

in

attempting

are

to

inadequately

In the final section, I will consider whether or

not a new theory, which incorporates the helpful contributions of both Tillich
and

Pannenberg,

while

better

accounting

for

elements

not

adequately

represented in their individual thought, can provide a more adequate account
of the contemporary experience of revelation.

Essential Elements in the Experience of the Reality of Revelation

.

'

In our initial discussion of revelation in chapter one we looked at a wide

variety of ways in which the experience of revelation can be understood.
Underlying

revelation
experienced.

every

theory

is

the

conclusion

that

the

conceptual

term

refers to a recognizable and distinct aspect of reality which can be
What varies from theory to theory are the conditions and limits

which are established in attempts to define conceptual terms more clearly.

What
term

the characteristics of the aspects of reality which are identified with the
"revelation"

are;

when

these aspects are experienced; where

these
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aspects are experienced; in whom

these aspects are experienced; how

aspects are experienced; and finally why

these

these aspects are experienced are

the questions to be addressed.
We

have

understanding
thinker.

seen

of

from

these

the

analysis

conditions

in

varies

the

first

considerably

chapter
from

that

the

thinker

to

In what follows, I will attempt to identify conceptual limits of what,

when, where, in whom, how and why with regard to the concept of revelation.
I will begin by briefly explaining the question and offering an example from
our initial discussion of revelation in general from chapter one.

Next I will

evaluate Tillich's and Pannenberg's answer to the question pointing out their
significant

strengths

considering

aspects

and
of

weaknesses.
both

Tillich

Finally
and

I

will

Pannenberg,

suggest
a

more

that

by

adequate

understanding of the contemporary experience of revelation will result.

What?

Any theory attempting to understand revelation must evaluate what is
being experienced.

In chapter one, this is most clearly seen in the existential,

ontological thought of Macquarrie.

'

experience of being.

According to Macquarrie, revelation is the

A condition of the experience of this reality is that it is

not a thing but rather is necessary for anything to exist.

Another condition

defining the experience of revelation is its transcendence in the sense that it
does not participate in the subject/object structure of temporal spatial reality.
Thus the experience of being is more like a presence and manifestation within
our experience of immanent things.
participation

and

concern.

This experience demands involvement,
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Tillich, like Macquarrie. understands revelation as the reality of being
itself which does not function within the subject/object structure of reality.
It is the unconditional, infinite, transcendent, essential foundation of all that

exists.
being.

Being itself is that which influences the essential structure of our
In the negative sense, it is understood as the threat of non-being.

In

the positive sense, it is understood as an ultimate concern.
In the psyche, being itself is experienced as ecstasy ("standing outside
oneself").169

In humanity's finite situation, being itself is understood as that

which bridges the gap between the finite and the infinite.

In the existential

situation, being itself is represented by Christ as the essential/existential New
Being.

In humanity's combined finite/existential

situation, being itself is

understood with the symbol of the divine Spirit which manifests itself in the
human spirit.

In history, being itself is understood by means of the symbol of

the Kingdom of God which itself has both inner and trans-historical aspects.
For Tillich, being itself remains relatively static in history despite the
dynamic nature of both history and human nature.
takes on a universal character.

In this sense, being itself

Despite the universal character of being itself,

humanity is limited by non-being (finitude).

The experience of being in the

face of non-being in the positive sense involves couragel 70, in the negative
I

sense, anxiety.
One of the strengths of Tillich's understanding of what revelation is lies
in

his

focus

on

the

manifestation

particular experiences of the individual.

of revelation

in

the

present

within

This experience is open to all people,

169The following five descriptions of being itself in the thought of Tillich come from our
analysis of the five books of his Systematic Theology.
I 70see Tillich's excellent discussion of this in his work The Courage to Be (Yale
University Press, 1952).
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at any time. with any thing, person, or event.
limitless.

all

pervading

reality

which

It discloses a universal,

is experienced

in

the now.

This

understanding of God in the present is grounded in the Hebrew Scriptures.
Yahweh was revealed to Moses as "I Am" rather than as "I Was" or "I Will Be."
Tillich's conception of revelation as humanity's ultimate concern in the face
of being provides a good explanation of what is experienced as revelation in
present things, people, and events.

Tillich, however, is less concerned with

the value of revelation that has been experienced in the past and will be
experienced in the future for people in the present.

Despite the fact that the

experience of revelation in present things, people, and events is essential. it is
just as important to consider the present experience of past experience and
potential experience.

Pannenberg's eschatological understanding of what the

reality of revelation is attempts to do just that.
Whereas Tillich is primarily concerned with the experience of present
things. people, and events; Pannenberg is concerned with the experience of
revelation in the past, present and future. For Pannenberg, revelation is a
single, unified, universal reality which stretches the span of history.
describes this universal history as truth itself.
very process of history.

'

He

The essence of this truth is the

The meaning of any particular event, person, thing,

depends upon an understanding of the whole of this reality.

In order to

understand what things mean in the present, we need to know what they
meant in the past and in the future.

This essential future · orientation is

fulfilled with the resurrection of Christ.
God,
personal way.

for Pannenberg,

is

the

experience

of universal

history

in

a

This understanding of God is not concerned with past events,

chronological records,

but with the inquiry and discovery of a universal,
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comprehensive, continuity of meaning which connects all things, events, and
people.

What revelation

is,

for Pannenberg, is

incomplete disclosure of reality in its wholeness.

the

limited,

questionable,

It is something humanity

must continually strive to understand and experience.
A strength of Pannenberg's understanding of what revelation is lies in
emphasis on the whole of reality: past, present and future.
the

present

potential

is

important,

experience,

it

is

but

without

recognizing

not

possible

to

Clearly a focus on

past

adequately

experience

understand

and

present

Pannenberg is much more concerned with the manifestation of

experience.

revelation within humanity as a whole and experience in general (involving
eschatology).

Pannenberg has a more difficult time accounting for the depth

of the revelatory experience.
Both Tillich and Pannenberg understand revelation to be a universal,
ultimate reality.
focus

What differs are the aspects of reality each has chosen to

Tillich provides

on.

experience

of

revelation

in

the necessary

depth of understanding for the

the

while

present,

Pannenberg

provides

the

necessary breadth for understanding revelation throughout all of history.

I

suggest that a more adequate understanding of the experience of revelation
should include the depth of Tillich's ontological focus and the breadth of

'

Pannenberg's

eschatological

focus.

Thus,

revelation

is

the

experience

of

being itself as humanity's ultimate concern within the universal continuity of
truth including the present as well as past and potential things, people and
events.

The experience of revelation is not only humanity's ultimate concern

nor universal history but is best understood as a universal history of ultimate
concern.
but

The experience of revelation is adequately described with ontology,

without

considering

ontological

experience

in

the

past

or

possible
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experience

of the

future,

the

understanding

looses

its

universal,

holistic

perspective necessary for a truly adequate understanding of the experience.
Thus, the understanding of revelation in either Tillich or Pannenberg alone
does not account for the experience of revelation as well as a theory which
emphasizes

the

eschatological

focused

ontological

aspects

of

Tillich

and

the

broad

aspects of Pannenberg together.

When?

Understanding

when

the

experience of revelation

is

also

an

Within this category there

essential element in attempting to understand it.
seems to be much more diversity.

occurs

This diversity is clearly illustrated from

chapter one in the typological survey of Dulles' Models of Revelation.

Those

who maintain Dulles' doctrinal model assert that revelation occurs when one
comes

in

contact

historical

model,

with

ecclesial

authority,

dogma,

and

scripture.

In the

revelation occurs either when one comes in contact with

individual historical deeds, persons, events and traditions or, as in the case of
Pannenberg,
totality.

'

when

one

apprehends

history

in

its

universal,

comprehensive,

In the inner experiential model, revelation occurs when one comes in

contact with God as a reality communicated within the soul of the individual.
In the fourth

model, revelation occurs in history, personal experience, and

doctrines only when God chooses to be present to those who have faith.

And

finally, in the fifth model, revelation occurs when human consciousness is
raised to the level of being able to apprehend the experience of being through
all

things.
For Tillich, clearly revelation occurs when one comes in contact with
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any

thing

constellation.

which

has

entered

the

special

conditions

of

a

revelatory

Events, people, language, things (e.g. rocks, trees, stars, etc.)

doctrine, and history can become media of revelation.

It is essential to

recognize that it is never the thing itself which is revelatory, rather it is
being itself which uses these things as a mode of expression.
be sure that God is not identified within this world.
distance between humanity and God.
long as we are finite.

Tillich wants to

His position puts some

Our understanding of God is ambiguous as

For Tillich the problem is humanity's inability to

understand the ultimate (essence) from a limited perspective (existence).

The

significance of Christ is in his ability paradoxically to exist essentially.

The

experience of Christ teaches Christians how to exist more and more essentially.
For Tillich, this experience of Christ must be existential and ontological, and
consequently cannot only be historicat.171
A strength of Tillich's position is in his
accessibility of the reality of revelation.
experiences any aspect of reality.

ability

to express the

It is experienced whenever one

Revelation understood as one's ultimate

concern in the face of the experience of being itself, expresses its ultimate,
essential, omnipotent character.

Christ is the existential experience of the

coming together of existence and essence.

Although Tillich stresses the

'

necessity of understanding the history (existence) of Jesus as well as the being
(essence) of Christ, he is not as concerned with viewing the experience of any
ultimate concern in the continuity of its universal history.

Tillich provides an

essential explanation of revelation as an experience which occurs whenever
one has an ultimate concern regarding any aspect of reality, but

he is not as

171 Recall that historical experience, for Tillich, is objective and is limited by finitude.
Thus the experience of the finite/infinite nature of Christ must be existential.
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concerned with the necessity of viewing this experience of ultimate concern
in

the

continuity

experience

of

universal

history.

of revelation occurs only

Pannenberg

when

suggests

that

one understands history

in

the
its

totality.
For Pannenberg, revelation occurs only when one is able to conceive of
the universal, comprehensive unity of reality of history.
Pannenberg

also

suggests

that

human

finitude

Similar to Tillich,

prevents

a

complete

understanding of revelation because humanity is unable to understand history
in its totality (one cannot fully understand the future).

For Christians, a

provisional understanding of God is possible with the eschatological reality of
Christ whose resurrected reality provides a glimpse of the future history.

This

understanding of reality (universal history), even though limited, is required
if one desires to understand the meaning of any particular event, thing, or
person.
A

strength

experience
fullness.

of

Pannenberg's

of revelation

occurs

position

is

when

one

only

in

his

emphasis

understands

that

an

in

its

history

Christ becomes a disclosure of the future which breaks into the past

and allows people in the present to grasp a provisional view of the whole of
history

'

which

is

necessary

particular aspect of reality.

for

one

to

understand

the

meaning

of

any

Although Pannenberg emphasizes the value of

conceiving of a universal history in the understanding revelation, he is less
concerned
things

with

within
The

accounting

universal

moment

for

the

experience

of revelation

in

particular

according

Tillich

history.

when

revelation

occurs,

to

and

Pannenberg, differs because they focus on different aspects of reality.

For

Tillich, it occurs when one experiences the ontological reality of being.

For
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Pannenberg it occurs when one views history in its totality.

Consequently,

their corresponding conceptions of the meaning of Christ differ as well.
Tillich emphasizes the value of the existential experience of Christ while
Pannenberg focuses on the eschatological experience.

I suggest that a more

complete understanding of revelation should emphasis ontological as well as
historical aspects.
the

fullest

ontological
history.

This universal ultimate concern in history maintains that

understanding
reality

of revelation occurs

of ultimate concern

when

one

focuses

within the universal

on

the

continuity of

Also, the meaning of Christ is best understood when one understands

him as an existential experience bringing together existence and essence as
well

as the eschatological

Viewing

experience providing a glimpse of the future.

revelation as a universally ultimate historical concern provides a

more adequate understanding of when the experience of revelation occurs.

Where?

Where revelation occurs is also an essential element in attempting to
understand it.

This category involves the complex interrelation between an

immanent experience of reality and a transcendent experience of reality.

'

I

have been using the term "reality" to denote the whole of human experience.
Both immanent reality and transcendent reality exist and consequently are
real.

Those

aspects

of reality

which

are

immanent

are

limited

by

the

conditions of time and space and participate within the relationship between
subject and object.

Those which are transcendent do not.

The complexity of

where revelation occurs is addressed in chapter one in Niebuhr's discussion of
internal and external history.

As you recall, for Niebuhr, revelation occurs as
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faith

or,

members

the

recognition of meaning and unity,

within

a community.

Thus

experience in the lives of people.

"internal

in the personal
history"

is

lives of

a transcendent

For Niebuhr, the transcendent experience

of inner history depends upon what he calls "external history."

External

history involves the impersonal objects, ideas, and happenings that form the
foundation and structure of the world in which we live, communicate, and
function.

Thus, external history is the experience of the immanent foundation

and structure of finite reality.

We have also seen in chapter one that Kaufman

too maintains the significance of the reality of revelation being experienced
within the correlation between historical and existential elements.

For him,

the first norm of revelation stresses revelation in history, scripture, tradition,
and

doctrine.

ontological

The

second

norm

focuses

on

revelation

in

experience.

For Tillich,

an ultimate concern emerges

when

one experiences the
The reality of

transcendent reality of being itself within immanent reality.
what

is

reality.

contemporary

revealed

is

not part of the

subject/object

structure of immanent

But because humanity lives, functions and thinks within immanent

reality, any experience of the transcendent reality of revelation must involve
immanent

experience.

Tillich

does

caution

against

being

ultimately

'

concerned with only immanent things without reference to the transcendent
component of the reality of being itself.
Because of human finitude,
within

the

This is what he calls the demonic.

humanity is unable to fully

subject/object structure of reality.

grasp being itself

Within history,

understood with the symbol of the Kingdom of God.

revelation

is

Just as the transcendent

reality of being itself is understood to be mediated through the immanent
reality of the present, the Kingdom of God is understood to have a trans-
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historical side. which when manifest within immanent history. is understood
as inner history.

This trans-historical side allows the symbol of the Kingdom

of God to answer the questions implied in the ambiguities of the dynamics of
history.

For Tillich the central manifestation of the Kingdom is in the Christ.
A strength of Tillich's ontological understanding of revelation is in his

ability to maintain the closeness of revelation.

Also. with ontology he is able

to stress the unlimited. ultimate, omnipotent presence of the divine.

He is able

to describe God as the foundation of all things. the creator of all things, as that
which is ultimate for all to experience.

There is no doubt that Tillich's

understanding of the reality of revelation is adequately represented with his
understanding of being itself.

However, Tillich has a more difficult time

expressing how the dynamic process of history, involving humanity in the
finite condition, relates to the ultimate experience of revelation.

For Tillich,

history finally becomes transparent to the disclosure of that which is beyond
being and non-being.

One could argue that Tillich neglects the significance

of immanent reality and the history of this reality in order to preserve the
ultimate transcendent reality of revelation.

I think this is the case because

Tillich, from the start, has been more concerned with what the reality of
revelation is rather than where or how it is experienced.

Pannenberg, on the

other

the

'

hand,

is

more

concerned

with

expressing

how

experience

revelation must include an understanding of the process of history.

of

History.

for Pannenberg, is an event which is shared by the individual and God.
For Pannenberg, revelation as universal history is an experience of
immanent reality.

He recognizes that all human experience is limited by

finitude, and thus, any experience of revelation is finite and concerned with
immanent reality.

Pannenberg is clearly less "Platonically idealistic" than
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Tillich in his view of reality.

Whereas Tillich was able to maintain the

"purity" or ultimacy of the reality of revelation with ontological categories,
Pannenberg does so by stressing that our experience of the reality is a process
that is not yet complete.

The whole exists, but we, because of the limits of

finitude, are unable to fully recognize it.
truth is one.

For Pannenberg, the essence of

There is no experience which is not an element of revelation.

Revelation does not occur behind things, above things, or through things: all
things, events, and people, when understood in the continuity of meaning of
universal

history,

are

elements

of

This

revelation.

understanding

of

revelation necessarily includes a conception of the future in order to complete
the whole of history.

This is fulfilled with the eschatological reality of Christ.

Humanity participates in God, with Christ, not by looking away from the world
but by transforming the world in the direction of God.
The

significant

strength

of Pannenberg's

view

of

where

revelation

occurs is that he is able to maintain "as all things" rather than "beyond all
things."

With Pannenberg, there is a stress in the value of immanent reality.

The underlying theme of his theology is that the limited human condition is
all we have right now, don't abandon it.172

Because of this focus, Pannenberg

insists
I

the

that

theology

academic disciplines.

be

concerned

with

research

and

results

of all

For him, God is the creator of all things and is one.

Pannenberg manages to express the tremendous value of all things as well as
the value of viewing reality in it comprehensiveness.
time expressing the depth of reality.

He has a more difficult

Because of this he is unable to express

how, if possible, one can experience God in particular things apart from the

1720ne could criticize Tillich for setting up the Platonic dichotomy stressing the good of
the transcendent and the illusion and imperfection of the immanent.
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continuity of history.

The problem that inevitably results from this position is

that it is unable to explain how billions of people, who are unable to learn, or
comprehend universal history, are

able to experience God.17 3

Although I

think it is essential to comprehend universal history in attempting to grasp
the experience of revelation in the fullest possible way, I believe that it is also
necessary to stress that the experience of revelation can occur in particular
things apart from a conception of universal history.
Both Tillich and
Ii mitedness.

Pannenberg are careful

to stress humanity's

Although both maintain that the experience of revelation is

possible, they are insistent that this experience is incomplete.

By focusing on

different aspects of reality, Tillich and Pannenberg explain this dialectical
presence of God in different ways; Tillich with ontology. Pannenberg with
history

and

eschatology.

Tillich

ontological experience which

discusses

the

more

universal,

idealistic

is manifest within things, people and events,

while Pannenberg stresses the value of things, people and events themselves
within their historical continuity.

I

suggest that the fullest, most adequate

understanding of revelation should include Tillich's focus on the reality of
revelation within all things as the ontological experience of ultimate concern
as well as the experience of a universal history of all things in the continuity

'

that reveals their ultimate meaning.

I suggest that one can, in a more than

necessarily limited way, experience revelation either by having an ultimate
concern or by recognizing the universal structure of history.

However, I

believe the most adequate and fullest understanding of revelation should focus
on the ontological reality of being itself leading to ultimate concerns as well as

17311 seems to me that in many cases it is the people who are the poorest and who know the
least of universal history who have the strongest faith and experience of revelation.

95
a focus on the ultimate value of the historical process of immanent reality
which leads to a universal conception of reality.

Who?

When attempting to understand revelation, it is important to consider
who experiences it.

For the most part, this category involves the conditions

established in the other categories.

For example, Macquarrie maintains that

revelation occurs in the one who experiences the mood of anxiety; for the
doctrinal advocates it. is the one whose heart is open to the spirit of God; for
those maintaining the dialectical presence its the one who has faith and whom
God chooses to be revealed.
that

It is clear from chapter one that all theories of

revelation

maintain

all

of

humanity

revelation.

For Tillich, the one who comes in contact with the reality of being

itself experiences an ultimate concern.
ultimate concern.

is

capable

of

experiencing

All people are capable of having

For Pannenberg, any person able to comprehend reality in

its totality of its past, present, and future, can experience revelation.

All

people are capable of viewing history universally.
Both

Tillich

and

Pannenberg

experienced by all people.

maintain

that

those

people

who

experience revelation.
universal

have

can

be

Tillich's suggests that people having an ultimate

concern in the face of being itself experience revelation.
is

revelation

an

understanding

of

For Pannenberg, it

universal history

that

I suggest that it is people who have an ultimate

historical concern who experience revelation.
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How?

How revelation is experienced is another tremendously complex and
highly

diversified

category.

Whether

revelation

is

concerned

with

propositional truth, historical truth or personal truth, there are two general
ways the reality of revelation is thought to be experienced: either mediated or
immediate.
to be

Propositions, history, and personal experience are either thought

revelation or mediate

revelation

is

immanent

experiences

it is

reality

revelation.

are

concerned

with

or

concerned

which

revelation.

The question is whether the reality of
If

transcendent.
with

determining

If transcendent,

immanent

immanent,
which

then

how

aspects of immanent

then how one experiences

aspects

of

reality

one

mediate

it is

transcendent

reality.
The following are examples of mediated and immediate revelation as
propositional, historical, and personal experience.

Dulles' propositional model

suggests that doctrine mediates the supernatural revelation of God.
other hand,

On the

contemporary Christian fundamentalism maintains that doctrine,

particularly biblical scripture, is a direct immediate revelation.

They are not

concerned with attempting to identify what is revealed through the Bible

'

because the what and the Bible

Kaufman

maintains

that

are one and the same.

revelation

is

conveyed

With regard to history,

through

tradition

functions as a medium of the ontological reality of revelation.

which

Pannenberg,

on the other hand, maintains that history, when viewed from a universal
perspective, is an immediate experience of revelation.

All human experience

falls within the bounds of universal history.

Finally, with regard to personal

experience,

maintains

Schleiermacher,

for

example,

that

revelation

is
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mediated through the person and is experienced as the feeling of dependence
upon God.

Ascetics, on the other hand. maintain that there is no distinction

between the person and the reality of God: they are one and the same.
How revelation is understood. immediate or mediate, is presented by
Cook as discussed
understanding
historical

the

in chapter one.
complex

He maintains that the

interrelationships

between

truth, personal truth, transcendent truth,

metaphoric.

For

Cook,

understanding

the

process of

propositional

and

truth,

immanent truth,

revelatory

process

is

involves

metaphor, story, and symbol because of the narrative quality of all human
experience.

This use of metaphoric process attempts to explain how it is that

one can know, interpret, and understand revelation.
Tillich

understands

the

reality

of

revelation

to

be

transcendent.

it manifests itself through immanent reality.

The unconditional,

infinite, transcendent reality is manifest in finite reality.

Because being itself

although

is transcendent and manifest through immanent reality, it is only possible to
discuss it by using symbols.

According to Tillich, symbols have the ability to

participate within immanent reality but yet can point to the transcendent.
Symbolic language manages to bridge the gap between the finite and infinite.
Thus all talk of God and to God must use symbols.

According to him, we could

not communicate with God if he were only ultimate being.

In our relationship

with him, we encounter him with the highest of what we are -- person.

In

speaking and thinking of, and to, God with symbols we can involve our limited
(finite) nature with the unlimited (infinite) nature of God.

For Tillich, the

reality of the personal is not confined to the limits of finitude. we are.
we are finite, our experience of the personal is limited.

Because

Thus in speaking of

God as unlimited and personal. the problem is not with God being infinitely
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personal

but

with

humanity's

attempt to

understand

this

conceptually .1 1 4

Tillich attempts to avoid this by suggesting that God can only be thought of
symbolically.

Remember that for Tillich, symbols are able to participate

within limits of finitude while pointing to the infinite.
A strength in Tillich's understanding of how we experience revelation
is that it is able to maintain that God is ultimate and infinite and is separate
from humanity which is limited, but at the same time, is closer to humanity
than we are to ourselves and is able to communicate with us.

Tillich's view

explains how it is that God can be ultimate and omnipotent on the one hand
and allow humanity the complete freedom of choice on the other.

If God were

"automatically" experienced like a tree, humanity would have no choice but to
know God.

But by suggesting that God is present only to those who desire his

presence allows humanity to freely choose their destiny.

For Tillich, the

experience of revelation requires faith.

Clearly Tillich's focus is on this

transcendent

However

experience

of

revelation.

if the

only

means

of

experiencing revelation is through finite reality, then finite reality is just as
important

as

transcendent

in

understanding

revelation.

For this

needed

emphasis on the immediate experience of the finite, we tum to Pannenberg.
Pannenberg maintains that there is no experience of reality outside the
limits of finitude.

Thus, all experience of reality. including the reality of

revelation, is immediate.

Because of finitude, humanity needs to use symbols

when referring to God.

But rather than suggesting that the individual has a

difficult time grasping the infinite through the finite, Pannenberg suggests
that the whole of reality, which reveals God, is not yet known.

In order for

l 7 4 Recall that for Tillich conceptual understanding necessarily involves the finite limits
of time and space.
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one to experience revelation, it is necessary to understand the continuity of
truth which is history.
understand

a

It is not possible to narrow mindedly

particular perspective

(stemming

from

the

experience

present event, person, thing) apart from the whole of truth.
suggests

that

we

must

look beyond

the

particular,

attempt to

precise

of a

Pannenberg
focus

of the

scientific method and view reality with the more comprehensive horizon of
history.
results

Within this universal history, however, Pannenberg insists that the
of scientific

particular

focus

research be

of

science

included.

lacks

depth;

History

without

while

history

the

precise,

without

the

comprehensive, unifying, continuity of truth lacks meaning.
Pannenberg

perceives

a

problem

culture views the experience of reality.
from

with

how

contemporary

secular

He suggests that the problem stems

erroneous conviction that particular, empirical, scientific data is the

limit of experience.

What much of contemporary secular culture has lost by

focusing almost exclusively on science is the meaning which comes from a
more comprehensive view of reality.

The rectification of this problem does

not concern humanity's ability to experience the meaning of revelation, but
with convincing people of the veracity of revelatory experience and teaching
them the language with which to understand it (myth, metaphor, symbol).

By

showing that science is part of a more comprehensive reality that makes up a
universal history, Pannenberg hopes to expand the horizon of experience for
contemporary
A

culture.

strength

experienced

is that

of
it

comprehensive horizon

Pannenberg's

understanding

demonstrates the

need

for

of

how

an

understanding

of experience in order to grasp

revelation

revelation.

is

of a
This

comprehension is developed, in part, by adding scientific depth to the breadth
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of universal history.

Most importantly though is the need to understand the

whole of history in light of an eschatological focus on a provisional future.
This provisional future

similarly adds an element of faith in Pannenberg's

understanding of the experience of revelation.
Both Tillich and Pannenberg suggest that because of human finitude,
the experience of revelation requires faith and the use of symbol.

Tillich's, on the transcendent;

however, is on different aspects of reality.
Pannenberg's, on the immanent.

I suggest that a better understanding of

revelation is possible by combining aspects of both views.
the

transcendent

comprehension

to

aspects

of

Pannenberg's

Their focus,

revelation
universal

would

history.

Tillich's focus on

provide
Pannenberg's

additional
focus

on

aspects of immanent reality would provide the needed emphasis on medium
through

which

revelation

ultimate

universally

is

historical

received.
concern

Understanding
would

provide

revelation
a

more

as

an

authentic

explanation of how we experience the reality of revelation.

Why?

The final question that must be dealt with if an adequate understanding
of revelation is to be made is why is it experienced?

In light of our analysis of

revelation in chapter one, it is clear that there are fewer attempts to answer
the question of why.

The clearest response in Dulles' models is within the

understanding of revelation as new awareness.
experience revelation because it is who we are.

This model suggests that we
As a result of a more advanced

stage of human consciousness we have come to realize the divine presence
within us.

Why do we experience revelation is the same as asking why do we
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experience a tree -- because we are able, and it exists.
For Tillich, we experience revelation because we are a mixture of being
and non-being.

Asking the questions involved in being implies that there is

something about being which we do not possess, otherwise we would not ask
the question.

Also, there is something of being which we do possess which

allows us to make it the object of a question.

Thus, part of who we are involves

this ultimate reality which is a part of everything but yet never merely a
thing.

Being itself is the ground and substance of our being and the being of

all things.

We must strive to experience revelation because it is our ultimate

concern.
A strength of Tillich's view is that it emphasizes the essence of God
within all of creation.

Because of this essential presence in all reality,

humanity's ultimate concern is the experience of revelation.

In order to

understand more fully who we are, we need to recognize the continuity of
truth within universal

history.

For Pannenberg, we experience revelation as universal history because
it is the only way we can understand the meaning of any particular aspect of
reality.

'

Humanity has an innate need to recognize meaning in life.

This

meaning can only be understood by grasping the continuity of truth which
forms

the substance of universal history.

Whether one is interested

in

grasping the meaning of a thing, person, event, or word, it is necessary to
have an understanding of universal history.
A

strength

in

Pannenberg's

understanding of humanity's
meaning in life.
ultimate

concern.

view

historical

is

identity

that

it

recognizes

is important in

that

an

recognizing

The comprehensiveness of universal history is humanity's
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Both Tillich and Pannenberg suggest that the experience of revelation
is essential and of ultimate value in life.

I suggest that a better understanding

of why humanity experiences revelation can obtained by looking at aspects of
both Tillich and Pannenberg.

By including Pannenberg's focus on universal

history, Tillich's understanding of the essence of revelation in all creation is
expanded to include the whole of history.

By including Tillich's focus on the

potential for all things to be of ultimate concern, Pannenberg's understanding
of the value of historical identity is deepened to include the depth of being.
We desire to experience revelation because it discloses our depth of being
within the whole of history.

Concluding Thoughts

In this thesis I began with a general analysis of revelation.
with Dulles' typological survey of revelation.
attempt to

gain some historical perspective.

I began

Next, I turned to Bailie in an
I then

refered to

Niebuhr,

Macquarrie, Kaufman, and Cook in order to lay out some of the significant
details of thought about revelation.

I turned to an analysis of revelation

pnderstood as ultimate concern in the thought of Tillich and as universal
history in the thought of Pannenberg.

And finally, in this section I have

analyzed the various ways that the experience of the reality of revelation can
be conceptualized.

Also, I have discussed the significant aspects of Tillich's

and Pannenberg's understanding of revelation in relation to these categories.
I pointed out the significant strengths and weaknesses of both Tillich and
Pannenberg with regard to these categories.

Finally, I have suggested a new

way to understanding the experience of revelation which involves elements of
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thought

in

both

Tillich

and

Pannenberg.

I

suggest

that

this

new

understanding of revelation accounts for the experience of revelation more
adequately than either Tillich's or Pannenberg's theory alone.
the cornerstone of all theological thought.

Revelation is

By providing a general discussion

of the various ways it has been understood, as well as a focused analysis of the
way in which Tillich understands it as ultimate concern and Pannenberg as
universal

history,

and

finally

by

suggesting

that

an

understanding

of

revelation which includes elements from Tillich and Pannenberg would allow
for

a more

adequate

understanding,

I have contributed to the on going

discussion of the meaning and experience of the reality of revelation in the
world today.
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